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Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
introduced the capability of the military forces of the United States to wage a new kind of 
war.  This brand of warfare is dynamic and rapidly changing to meet new challenges on a 
daily basis.  Our warriors are part of a force that is more mobile and agile, capable of 
moving about the battlefield with unprecedented speed. 
One of the changes that enabled this agility is an increase in the reliance of 
contracted service support for operational forces on the battlefield.  Transferring many 
service support functions to civilian contractors allowed the commanders to focus their 
attention on combat forces rather than on mundane support functions. 
 While the increased use of contractors to provide services on the battlefield 
created benefits to the operational forces, it also created many unintended consequences.  
These negative effects include basic issues such as unexpected termination of services or 
duplication of services at additional costs.  There are also more severe negative effects 
including kidnappings and loss of life. 
In an attempt to provide a means to coordinate the efforts of the hundreds of 
thousands of contractor personnel in Iraq, the Department of Defense assisted in the 
establishment of the Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC).  The ROC was intended 
to provide a central coordination node for contractor activity in Iraq. 
 The development of the ROC sought to reduce and mitigate these kinds of 
occurrences by providing a means for contractors to coordinate and communicate with 
military forces operating in the area.  The ROC would provide a daily threat assessment 
based on information gathered from the DoD, the Department of State and contractors 
operating in the area.  The ROC would also provide a means to track the movement of 
contractors so the military commanders would be aware of who was transiting their area.  
Additionally, the ROC would provide a communication life-line to contractors who 
became the victims of insurgent fires or improvised explosive devices. 
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 In order to rapidly bring the ROC online in Iraq, without taking away forces from 
operational missions, the decision was made to contract out the management of the ROC.  
In June of 2004, the contract to manage the ROC was awarded to AEGIS Defence, a 
British Private Security Company.  AEGIS continues to manage the ROC up to the time 
of publication. 
Purpose of the Project 
The objective of this report is to conduct an analysis of command and control 
relationships between civilian contractors and military units on the battlefield and 
identify any weaknesses in those relationships.  Through the results of this analysis, the 
authors will seek to identify several courses of action the Department of Defense could 
pursue in order to improve the command and control relationship between contractors 
and major subordinate commands (MSC) on the battlefield. 
Findings 
 The unprecedented number of contractors supporting the operational forces in 
OIF has created a coordination problem that is significant and difficult to control.  The 
presence of this large civilian force operating in close quarters with military forces has, at 
times, placed both the contractors and the military in dangerous situations that could have 
been avoided with proper coordination.  For example, contractors who were unaware of 
the locations of military checkpoints have inadvertently fired on those checkpoints.  
Military forces that are unaware of a contractor convoy transiting their area have fired on 
contractor vehicles that have refused to stop.  Contractors have unknowingly transited 
areas of increased insurgent activity in Iraq, because they did not have the means to 
receive updated threat assessments. 
The DoD lacked a doctrinal approach to the management and coordination of 
contractors operating independently on the battlefield.  The sheer number of contractors 
necessary for reconstruction operations in Iraq was not planned for in OPlan 1003. 
The creation of the ROC was the first step in the incremental development of 
contractor coordination processes that continues to date.  Considering the complexity of 
the situation, the ROC has been quite successful at developing methods of tracking 
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contractor movement and providing a communications bridge between contractors and 
military forces. 
Contractors are not required to use the coordination services provided by the 
ROC.  Participation in the ROC is voluntary and left to the discretion of each contractor.  
Those contractors who choose not to participate in the ROC effectively remain invisible 
and anonymous to the military forces operating nearby.  With no means to effectively 
communicate, these contractors will be unable to request assistance in the event of an 
emergency. 
Despite the fact that the ROC is functioning as a critical coordination node on the 
battlefield, the management of the ROC has remained in the hands of a contractor, 
AEGIS Defence Services.  The DoD has not taken steps to ensure continuation of 
services provided by the ROC in the event of contract termination or default on the part 
of AEGIS. 
Recommendations 
 In order to preserve the lessons learned in OIF and continue the successful 
coordination processes created by the ROC, the following recommendations are made; 
1. Publish Joint Doctrine defining the role of the Reconstruction Operations Center. 
2. Make the oversight and control of the ROC a military function. 
3. Mandate participation in the ROC for all contractors. 
4. Increase the strategic and operational level of contracting planning. 
5. Develop pre-deployment training for command staffs concerning contractor 
operations and the ROC. 
Conclusions 
The system that developed in Iraq, of using regional ROCs supported and 
coordinated by a national ROC, has grown into a highly capable coordination system, but 
it requires subtle changes to make it more effective.  Mandatory participation by all 
contractors and more effective coordination with military forces will increase the benefits 
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that are attained.  Ultimately this will lead to increased coordination between contractors 
that will reduce duplication of effort and more importantly will reduce the incidence of 
friendly fire and contractor deaths. 
The coordination function performed by the ROC should be viewed as a critical 
military function on the battlefield.  The ROC should receive a level of support similar to 
a Joint Operations Center.  The increased reliance on contractor provided services to 
sustain military operations demands that the DoD take a more hands-on approach to 
coordinating the movement and actions of contractors on the battlefield. 
The ROC is a vital function when contractors are operating independently on the 
battlefield.  This critical coordination center should not be a contracted function, but 
should be established as a military command defined by joint doctrine.  The tactics, 
techniques, procedures and lessons learned must be preserved so this function may be 
repeated in the next conflict without experiencing the same steep, and deadly, learning 
curve. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Contractor support for military operations has grown significantly over the last 
two decades. Independent estimates place the total number of civilian contractors 
employed by the DoD in Iraq well above 200,000.  The tasks performed by contractors 
have expanded from traditional support roles to critical activities without which many 
expeditionary operations could not be sustained by military personnel.  The 
unprecedented number of contractors supporting the operational forces in OIF created a 
coordination problem that is significant and difficult to control.  The presence of this 
large civilian force operating in close quarters with military forces has, at times, placed 
both the contractors and the military in dangerous situations that could have been avoided 
with proper coordination. 
 
US troops in Iraq suffered through months of unnecessarily poor living 
conditions because some civilian contractors hired by the Army for 
logistics support failed to show up, Army officers said.  Months after 
American combat troops settled into occupation duty, they were camped 
out in primitive, dust-blown shelters without windows or air conditioning. 
The Army has invested heavily in modular barracks, showers, bathroom 
facilities and field kitchens, but troops in Iraq were using ramshackle 
plywood latrines and living without fresh food or regular access to 
showers and telephones.  Even mail delivery—also managed by civilian 
contractors—fell weeks behind.  
(Wood, 2003)  
 
Though living conditions in Iraq have improved, problems such as these raise new 
concerns about the Pentagon’s growing global reliance on defense contractors for 
everything from laundry service to combat training and aircraft maintenance. Civilians 
help operate Navy Aegis cruisers and Global Hawk, the high-tech, robot spy plane that 
provides the aerial footage featured so prominently on the evening news.  Civilian 
contractors may work well enough in peacetime, critics say, but what about in a crisis?  
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 “We thought we could depend on industry to perform these kinds of functions,” 
Lt. Gen. Charles S. Mahan, the Army’s logistics chief, said in an interview.   
 “You cannot order civilians into a war zone,” said Linda K. Theis, an official at 
the Army’s Field Support Command, which oversees some civilian logistics contracts. 
“People can sign up to that—but they can also back out.” (Wood, 2003) 
In yet another example, on April 4th, 2004, just days after the brutal killing of 
four Blackwater employees near Fallujah, the company once again found itself isolated 
and the subject of attacks by anti-coalition forces.  This time in Najaf, a city 
approximately 100 miles south of Baghdad, eight Blackwater employees contracted to 
provide security for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Headquarters withstood 
sniper, rocket propelled grenade and assault rifle attacks.  For up to three and a half hours 
the private security team repelled the attacks before local military forces could be 
mustered to come to their relief.  As a result, Blackwater initiated their own resupply 
mission using their private inventory of helicopters to deliver ammunition and evacuate 
wounded.   
 
A Defense Department spokesman said that there were no military reports 
about the opening hours of the siege on the CPA headquarters in Najaf 
because there were no military personnel on the scene. The Defense 
Department often does not have a clear handle on the daily actions of 
security contractors because the contractors work directly for the coalition 
authority, which coordinates and communicates on a limited basis through 
the normal military chain of command.  
(Priest, 2004) 
 
The two examples illustrated above demonstrate the complications and difficulties 
that have risen as a result of the DoD’s increasing reliance on civilian contractors.  Well 
into three years of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OIF/OEF), the US military has made use of an unprecedented level of contractor support 
on the battlefield.  While the contracting system has arguably proven flexible enough to 
deal with these changes, command and control of civilians on the battlefield has struggled 
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under the heavy strain of this new and complex burden.  The increased involvement has 
required contractors to become more closely integrated with the tactical units they 
support.  Contractors frequently work directly with operational military units, while the 
contracting officers responsible for overseeing and administering these contracts are 
located hundreds if not thousands of miles away. 
OIF also introduced the US military to the concept of Private Military Firms 
(PMFs)1 at an unprecedented and never before seen rate.  Never before has the US 
military had to work so closely with and rely on these loosely regulated paramilitary 
organizations.  The interaction and co-mingling with both reconstruction and military 
operations has produced significant issues never before encountered by the United States 
military.   
Despite these fundamental changes in US doctrine, the DoD continues to rely on 
existing command and control methods.  Existing methods make use of common 
communications equipment, training levels and liaison officers/teams with clearly 
defined roles and reporting.  These methods are simply not applicable to civilian 
contractors.  Conversely, the private security industry has struggled to balance a sense of 
duty and patriotism with their overall goal of making a profit and long-term financial 
success.    
 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this report is to conduct an analysis of command and control 
relationships between civilian contractors and military units on the battlefield and 
identify any weaknesses in those relationships.  Through the results of this analysis, the 
authors will seek to identify several courses of action that the DoD could pursue in order 
 
1 Private Military Firm, Private Security Company, Private Military Company, Private Security 
Contractors and Security Contractors are names and titles used to describe business organizations that 
provide professional services associated with warfare. They specialize in the provision of military skills, 
including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, 
and technical skills.  For purposes of consistency throughout this report, the phrase private security 
company (PSC) will be used.     
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to improve the command and control relationship between contractors and major 
subordinate commands (MSC) on the battlefield. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Through discussions with Naval Postgraduate School professors, contracting 
professionals and operations officers currently residing in the operating forces, the 
following questions and sub questions were developed as a basis for this research.  The 
questions are: 
1.  Is there a Coordination Problem Between Service Contractors and 
Supported Units? 
x If yes, how does this problem affect the supported unit? 
x If yes, is the problem significant enough to warrant a solution? 
x If yes, how can these problems be rectified in a manner that will allow the 
supported unit to accomplish its tactical mission and allow the contractor 
to operate efficiently? 
 
2.  Is there a Coordination Problem Between PSC Contractors and the Major 
Subordinate Commands (MSC) they are Operating Near or With? 
x If yes, is this a significant (life threatening) issue or merely an annoyance? 
x If yes, what is the historical basis for this problem and what has already 
been attempted or is currently in place and is it working? 
x If yes, how do we integrate PSCs with military planning without 
compromising operational security? 
When the above questions are answered, the DoD and in particular the acquisition 
community will be presented with several options for dealing with and coordinating with 
contractors on the battlefield.  By carefully examining and analyzing the answers to 
theses questions, this project will provide a way ahead in terms of potential doctrine, 
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regulation and tactical/operational changes aimed at improving and bettering the existing 
relationship between MSCs and PSCs.   
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This project relied on both primary and secondary research methods to construct 
an overview of command and control issues concerning civilian contractors on the 
battlefield.   
Primary research consisted of a combination of several techniques.  First, 
interviews were conducted via electronic mail with First Marine Expeditionary Force (I 
MEF) operations officers, AEGIS Defence Systems contractors and Joint Contracting 
Command Iraq (JCC-I) personnel currently in Iraq.  Second, a sample of contracts was 
examined.  These contracts spanned from October of 2005 to August 2006.  Finally, 
several questionnaires (Appendix I) were developed and targeted three distinct groups; 
civilian contractors, contracting officers and tactical commanders/operations officers.  
The results from these interviews and questionnaires provided current, real-world 
examples of the problems and shortfalls caused by current command and control 
mechanisms.  
Secondary research included reviews of previously awarded contracts, published 
books, scholarly journals, trade magazines and academic research papers.  This research 
provided historical perspective and an overview of the current command and control 
functions in OIF. 
 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Assumptions 
 As a backdrop, the authors made two general assumptions.   Both involve the 
need for this type of research and future conflicts.  The need for contracted support, be it 
for services or private security, will not be limited to just OIF/OEF.  This brand of 
conflict and the means in which the United States fights it, will be encountered again in 
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the future thus making this research applicable to discovering a way ahead vice simply 
looking backwards in an after action-like format.  The assumptions for this project are: 
a. First, it is of significant importance to the DoD to address these 
issues because the US will be involved in a similar level of conflict in the future. 
b. Second, the US military will continue to rely heavily on contractor 
support in the future. 
 
2. Limitations 
 The decision to contract for services and security has become a hotly contested 
issue within the US Federal Government.  This project explores several facets of the 
overall issue.  The size and scope of this issue are such that limitations were set in order 
to effectively manage data and analysis.  The limitations for this project are: 
a. First, due to the immense size and scope of the reconstruction 
efforts that are continuing in Iraq, this project does not include Allied contracting 
methods and relationships with PSCs. 
b. Second, this research and the majority of all data collected focuses 
on one sector of Iraq currently controlled by the US Marines, Multi National 
Forces West (MNF-W) region, Al Anbar Province.   
 
This project does not attempt to address the following topics: 
a. Whether or not it is appropriate to outsource for services in support 
of the US Military. 
b. Whether or not PSCs should be contracted to operate adjacent to or 
with in US military forces. 
c. Whether or not current methods of contracting were sufficient and 
effective (LOGCAP, sole source etc...). 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
This project is organized into four chapters.  Chapter I provides a short 
background, identifies research questions and relevant assumptions and limitations.  
Chapter II presents a historical perspective of the decision to outsource service functions, 
the command and control structure that is currently used in OIF and command and 
control problems that have occurred with contractors on the battlefield.  Chapter III 
provides an identification and analysis of problems uncovered during the course of this 
research.  Chapter IV presents recommendations and solutions to five problem areas 
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II. CONTRACTOR PLANNING AND INVOLVEMENT: PAST 
AND PRESENT  
A. OVERVIEW 
Contractor support for military operations has grown significantly over the last 
two decades. The tasks performed by contractors have expanded from traditional support 
roles to critical activities without which many expeditionary operations could not be 
sustained by military personnel.   
The use of contractors to provide support functions is not new to the DoD.  In 
fact, the use of contracting has been resident with American forces since the inception of 
our country and the military.   
This chapter will provide a brief look at the contracting chain of command from 
both functional and regulatory perspectives, outline the history of outsourcing for 
services and PSCs, describe problems that have risen as a result of civilians 
accompanying the force and finally present recent attempts at reform. 
 
B. THE CONTRACTING CHAIN OF COMMAND 
In the US military, the chain of command is a simple, highly visible tool for 
exercising control.  Symbols of rank are worn on the uniform so that a person’s position 
in the rank structure is readily apparent.  All members of the military receive extensive 
training on the roles and responsibilities of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and 
Enlisted personnel. 
A basic premise is that every military member has an unquestionable place in the 
chain of command.  They know whom they work for and who works for them.  The 
extent of their authority is clearly laid out by the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).  In combat, commanders are given specific Areas of Responsibility (AOR) they 
can draw on a map.  The commander is responsible for all military matters within that 
AOR.  When this class of society that has such well defined roles and responsibilities is 
required to blend with contractor personnel, who do not share the same chain of 
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command, it becomes necessary to define the primary players and their purpose, roles 
and responsibilities.   
 
1. The Contracting Chain of Command 
The contracting community does not share the same neat and orderly chain of 
command universally accepted by the operational forces of the military.  Roles and 
responsibilities become blurred.  Authority may be based more on experience rather than 
rank. 
 
a. The Commanding Officer 
The Commanding Officer is the officer in command of a military unit. 
Typically, the Commanding Officer has ultimate authority over his assigned forces, and 
usually has wide latitude to make decisions on the use of those forces. The Commanding 
Officer is also vested with legal power to enforce discipline and assign punishments 
within the boundary of military law. 
 
b. Contracting Officers 
The Contracting Officer is warranted2 with the authority to enter into 
legally binding contracts on behalf of the government of the United States.  The 
Contracting Officer also has the authority to make changes to existing contracts.  
Contracting Officers, whether they are military or civilian government employees, also fit 
into the chain of command.  In a contingency operation, the contracting officer will 
typically answer directly to the regional combatant commander.   
 
c. Contracting Officer’s Representative 
The Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is a non-warranted 
individual who has received training in contract administration duties and is assigned 
 
2 A warrant is an official document designating an individual as a Contracting Officer. 
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oversight for one or more contracts.  Ideally, the Contracting Officer will have enough 
CORs working for him to assign one to every area receiving contractor support.  The 
COR would provide the interface and communication channel between the contractor and 
the supported unit.  Historically, there have never been enough deployed CORs to make 
this possible. 
 
d. The Contractor 
The contractor is the individual or business that entered into a legally 
binding arrangement to provide services or goods.  Civilian contractors, regardless of to 
whom they are providing support, are only responsible to the contracting officer.  This 
relationship is established by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS).  The FAR specifies that only 
contracting officers have the authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts 
(FAR 1.602-1).  Additionally, the contracting officer has the sole authority to execute 
modifications to the contract (FAR 43.102). 
These two passages of the FAR dictate that all matters concerning the 
manner in which a contractor executes the terms of the contract must pass through the 
contracting officer.  A consequence of this command relationship is the fact that the local 
commander has very limited means at his disposal to maintain discipline among 
contracted employees working in his AOR.   
 
2. Governance of Contractor - Military Relationships 
 The specific relationship between contractors and the military forces they support 
has caused much confusion to individuals unfamiliar with contracting law and the FAR.  
Many military commanders make the false assumption that they have authority over 
contractor personnel providing support to their unit.  In addition to the FAR passages 
cited above, the following documents provide additional guidance on the relationship 
between the military and contractors. 
 
 16
a. Uniform Code of Military Justice  
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is codified as part of 
United States Code, Title 10.  The UCMJ is applicable to all members of the United 
States military forces.  The UCMJ is the governing body of law for all matters of 
discipline within the military forces.  It defines the requirements for following lawful 
orders and specifies punishments for failure to do so.   
According to the subchapter 1, section 802 of the UCMJ, in time of 
declared war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field are 
subject to the articles of the UCMJ.  This would include civilian contractors providing 
service support to military forces.  The key restriction is this section is only applicable in 
times of declared war, something that has not occurred since World War II.  This section 
does not apply during contingency operations.   
 
b. Military Extraterritoriality Jurisdiction Act  
If a contracted employee commits a felony crime, the Military 
Extraterritoriality Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 USC. 3261 will apply.  The 
MEJA states that DoD contractors may be federally prosecuted for felony-equivalent 
crimes committed outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. 
While the MEJA provides the means to deal with serious crimes 
committed by contractors, the commander can do very little to correct more minor 
infractions.  Prior to OIF, the US Army provided the following guidance:  
 
The military commander can indirectly influence the discipline of 
contractor employees through revocation or suspension of clearances, 
restriction from installations or facilities, or revocation of exchange 
privileges. 




The commander that does take these kinds of actions may find he has 
inadvertently violated the terms of the contract which may result in additional costs to the 
government.  If he removes access to facilities that were promised as part of the contract, 
the contractor may be able to file a protest and make demands for an equitable 
adjustment. 
 
c. DoD Instruction 3020.41 
Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel 
Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces, provides additional guidance to the 
commander and clarifies the lack of authority he has to enforce discipline:   
 
Defense contractors are responsible for ensuring employees perform under 
the terms of the contract; comply with theater orders, and applicable 
directives, laws, and regulations; and maintain employee discipline. The 
contracting officer, or designee, is the liaison between the commander and 
the defense contractor for directing or controlling contractor performance 
because commanders have no direct contractual relationship with the 
defense contractor. However, the ranking military commander may, in 
emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural disaster), 
direct contingency contractor personnel to take lawful action as long as 
those actions do not require them to assume inherently governmental 
responsibilities  
(Department of Defense, 2005) 
 
C. CONTRACTING FOR SERVICE SUPPORT 
1. History 
The practice of using civilian contractors to provide services to the United States 
military is as old as the US military itself.  Since the birth of our armed forces, civilian 
contractors have provided construction services, tailoring, food preparation, medical care 
and countless other services.  Relying on the private sector to support the needs of the 
military is not new, only the extent of that reliance on contractor support has varied over 
time. 
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The DoD’s choice to rely on civilian personnel for services has many economic 
benefits, but also brings a number of complications.  First and foremost of these 
challenges is the integration of civilian contractors within a rigid military chain of 
command that is accustomed to having authority over all personnel within their AOR.  
This lack of control often causes a sense of distrust and concerns about reliability.  
Conflicts between contractors and military commanders have caused disruptions in 
services, breaches in security and increased costs to the government.   
This challenge has been recognized for some time, but it is difficult to correct.  
Complaints about the lack of government control over contractors providing support can 
be traced back almost two hundred years: 
 
In a letter to Congress in 1818, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun spoke 
of contractors ‘subject to no military responsibility’ and upon whom there 
was no hold other than ‘the penalty of a bond.’ He went on to assert ‘it is 
often the interest of the contractor to fail at the most critical juncture.  
(Dunn, 2005)   
 
While the language is different, a second report from a senior official during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom expresses almost the same frustration experienced by Secretary 
Calhoun in 1818: 
 
A senior U. S. official in Iraq warned his superiors at the Pentagon’s 
program management office in Baghdad that Halliburton senior executives 
had said they were “considering withdrawing from the country” because 
of security concerns. The official noted that a cut in LOGCAP services by 
the firm would cause the “complete collapse of the support infrastructure” 
of the operation. Halliburton denied it was considering a withdrawal, 
while the CPA would not comment. Regardless, it underscored how 
vulnerable military officers felt the operation had become to outside 




                                                
Both of these letters cut to the heart of concern that many have in regards to the 
DoD’s heavy reliance on contractor support.  Many feel that civilian contractors do not 
posses the same sense of commitment military forces display.  The fear is that contractors 
will make seemingly arbitrary decision to cease support to the military at a key moment if 
the threat becomes too high. 
In the last ten years, there has been a sharp increase in the amount of reliance on 
contractors.  During Operation Desert Storm, the DoD utilized approximately 9,200 
contractors to provide services to the military.  Currently in Iraq, there are more than 
50,000 contractors employed by Halliburton alone.  Independent estimates place the total 
number of civilian contractors employed by the DoD in Iraq well above 200,000.3 (Dunn, 
2006) 
The increase in reliance on contractor support can be traced to a number of 
reasons.  Since the end of the cold war, the number of active duty armed forces has been 
steadily reduced.  While the size of the armed forces may be dictated by Congress, the 
make-up of those forces is not.  This means that the service chiefs, in order to maintain 
fighting forces, have chosen to eliminate military service support billets.  Additionally, 
force caps mandated by the President of the United States can limit the number of US 
military personnel that may be used in a given contingency operation.  When that cap is 
reached, contractors can be used to replace soldiers in support fields, freeing more space 
for combat troops. (GAO, 2003)  The increasing cost of maintaining the armed forces 
makes it economically attractive to outsource services that are only required during 





3 Determining the actual number of contractors employed by the DoD in Iraq has proven to be a 
significant challenge of its own.  GAO investigations have shown that the DoD lacks visibility over the 
flow of contractors into and out of Iraq.  The DoD was ordered to conduct a by-name survey of all 
contractors in Iraq by June 30, 2006. 
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2. Essential Services 
The reliance on civilian contractors to provide essential services during 
contingency operations has caused serious concerns.  The DoD defines essential services 
as:  
 
A service provided by a firm or an individual under contract to the 
Department of Defense to support vital systems in support of military 
missions considered of utmost importance to the US mobilization and 
wartime mission. The services, which shall be designated in the contract, 
are essential because the DoD components may not have military or DoD 
civilians to perform these services immediately or the effectiveness of 
defense systems or operations may be seriously impaired, and interruption 
is unacceptable when those services are not immediately available.  
(Department of Defense, 2005)   
 
The justifiable fear is that contractors may withdraw their support if the 
environment becomes too threatening, the rigors of contingency operations become too 
difficult or profit margins begin to narrow.  This concern is magnified when the 
realization is made that nearly all support services provided by contractors operating in 
Iraq are essential to mission accomplishment. 
DoD Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of Essential Services, provides the basis 
for mitigating the risks of relying on contractors.  The instruction directs commanders to 
identify those services that are essential and take the following action: 
 
6.5. Determine prior to contract award, or prior to modification to extend 
the performance period, whether an interruption of service would result in 
an unacceptable risk. If an unacceptable risk would result, develop a 
contingency plan to ensure continued service. 
(Department of Defense, 1990) 
 
It is left up to the commander’s best judgment to determine what is considered an 
unacceptable risk.  This leaves considerable room for variance in interpretation of this 
passage.  Some commanders may feel it is an acceptable risk to lose electricity while 
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another commander may feel it is an unacceptable risk to go without hot water for an 
extended period.  Once those areas of unacceptable risk are identified, commanders are 
further directed to develop their contingency plans to continue those services in the event 
of contractor default. 
A GAO audit conducted in 2003 focused on the handling of contracts in support 
of operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the initial build-up in Iraq.  The audit 
report found:  
 
…that DoD components have not conducted the directed reviews to 
identify those contracts providing essential services.  Despite requirements 
established in DoD guidance (Instruction 3020.37), DoD and the services 
have not identified those contractors that provide mission essential 
services and where appropriate developed backup plans to ensure that 
essential contractor-provided services will continue if the contractor for 
any reason becomes unavailable.  
(GAO, 2003) 
 
The GAO report leads the reader to believe that if the DoD follows the guidelines 
provided in DoD Instruction 3020.37, the risk of contractor default will be eliminated.  
By following this instruction, the DoD will ensure all contractor services deemed 
essential will have a redundant support plan in place to fall back on in the event the 
contractor is unable or refuses to fulfill the terms of the contract.  The fallacy of this 
assumption will be explained in the following section. 
 
3. Service Support Problems 
As the use of contractor personnel to replace military service support personnel 





a. Esprit de Corps Versus Profit 
In past conflicts, combat troops received direct support from organic 
military support providers called Combat Service Support (CSS) units, who in turn were 
supported indirectly by contractors through the supply chain.   
The commonality of military service created a shared sense of duty and 
responsibility between the frontline troops and CSS providers that fostered a sense of 
trust and accommodation.  While they may have been treated as “rear echelon” troops, 
CSS units still had the common military training that provides a basis of understanding 
and trust.  Additionally, since they are members of the military, when CSS providers 
operated in his AOR, the local commander retained authority over those troops. 
The current use of contractors to provide direct support to combat troops 
eliminates the commonality and sense of identity shared by members of the armed forces.  
CSS providers are members of the armed forces, so their focus is on supporting the 
combat troops in the best way possible.  Contractors are businesses, where the primary 
concern is making a profit.  It is often in the contractor’s best interest to provide the best 
possible services to the supported unit, but situations arise where the support required 
goes above and beyond the scope of their contract, or it may be more cost-effective to 
provide less than optimal service.  This is the area where current policy and doctrine falls 
short. 
 
b. The Impossibility of DoD Instruction 3020.37 
As mentioned in the previous section, DoD Instruction 3020.7 requires 
commanders to identify essential services provided by contractors and ensure a 
contingency plan is in place that will ensure continuation of those services.  When the 
current magnitude of reliance on contractor personnel to provide services to deployed 
personnel is examined, it is the authors’ opinion that it is impossible to fulfill the 
requirements of DoD Instruction 3020.37.   
With contractors providing everything from food preparation, to laundry 
services, to fuel delivery, it is difficult to find a service that is provided by a contractor on 
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the battlefield that should not be defined as essential.  With the reductions in troop 
manning levels, especially in the combat service support roles, there is not enough 
military manpower available to provide a redundant backup for all services that could be 
deemed essential. 
Commanders are left with one of two choices: pretend the services 
provided by contractors are not essential, or ignore the requirement of DoD Instruction 
3020.37 to create a plan to continue services in the event contractors are not able or 
refuse to fulfill the terms of their contract. 
 
4. Command Relationship 
The primary issue in this relationship is command and control authority between 
the tactical commander receiving support and the contractor providing that support.  The 
separation of the contractor from the military chain of command promotes a lack of trust 
with the forces receiving support.  Richard Dunn4 summed the situation up well when he 
said:  
Combat support contracts are critical to the needs of the combatant 
commander and, yet, management and control of contract performance is 
often vested in officials outside the chain of command of the operational 
commander or even the theater commander. How can such a system be 
made to work?   
(Dunn, 2005) 
 
Dunn’s comment gets to the heart of the concern that many commanders have in 
regards to contractors.  Commanders are accustomed to complete control over all aspects 
of their unit including care and support.  When the majority of the functions that go into 
that care and support are turned over to a civilian business, that is not required to answer 
to the commander, mistrust and suspicion are inevitable. 
 
 
4 Richard Dunn is a professor at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD.  
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D. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 
Media coverage and recent events could lead many to believe the use of private 
security or even hired soldiers is something new to warfare.  The facts are that the use of 
PSCs is as old as warfare itself.  Private warriors, often used in different capacities, have 
for a long time been an integral part of many countries’ strategy and foreign policy.   
 
1. History 
From as far back as Ancient Egypt and Victorian Britain, outsiders have been 
hired in one form or another to assist a country in its ability to fight wars.  Significant 
examples of early PSC contracting include ancient Greece and Rome.  Greece used 
outside specialists to build up certain areas of their armies for combat.  These specialists 
were mainly hoplites (infantry) from Syracuse, slingers (archers/artillery) from Crete and 
Thessalian cavalry.      
Roman armies augmented their ranks with foreign archers and cavalry from 
economically depressed regions of their empire.  As the empire matured into the fourth 
century, Roman armies were often comprised more of Germanic troops than Roman as it 
became more and more difficult to recruit from within the empire.   
The Bible even references contracted or hired armies in the Old Testament in its 
description of the Israelite’s journey out of Egypt.  The Pharaoh chased the Israelites out 
of Egypt with an army that included hired foreigners, while David and his men (when 
they were on the run from Saul) were employed in the Philistine army of Achish.” (Old 
Testament)   
History is replete with accounts of empires and countries acquiring the services of 
non-state actors to aide in war efforts.  Originally, many soldiers hired themselves out as 
independent free lance specialists. Soon, money and work would run out and soldiers 
were left with no home or career.  As a result, many soldiers formed companies.  These 
early organizations were designed to facilitate employment for the group and at a 
minimum provide protection.  The company would travel together seeking employment 
in the form of new campaigns to fight and subsist off the land and its people along the 
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way.  Over time these crude start-ups became better organized.  Many employed 
marketing and sales techniques.  Agreements or contracts were even employed, at times, 
with members for things such as length of service, pay and specific duties to be 
performed.  (P.W. Singer, 2003) 
 
2. Modern PSC Foundations 
Though taking on many forms and styles over the years, the modern PSC industry 
is considered to have begun in the early 1990s following the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Though debated somewhat in the PSC and academic arenas, modern PSC origins are 
thought to be derived from three separate, but related dynamics of the world at the time.   
 
a. The End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War brought the illusion of a safer and more peaceful 
world.  As a result, the need for large standing militaries was seen as unnecessary and 
expensive.  In the US, between the years 1985-1999,  the Army’s troop levels fell from 
800,000 to 480,000; cuts were less severe in the other services, but military manpower 
overall was off by an average of 30 percent.  Many of these personnel were highly trained 
military professionals from elite special operations units who were drawn to the private 
military/security industry by lucrative salaries and an opportunity to continue to work in 
an environment where they could continue to utilize their military skills.   
Unfortunately, the overly optimistic outlook on world events did not 
unfold as many had hoped.  For US forces, smaller scale operations in Somalia, Haiti, 
Cuba, Bosnia, Kosovo and the ever-present threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
caused many of the leaned out forces to see their operational tempo increase in this 
supposedly safer world.  The combination of smaller force levels and increased 
operational tempos opened the door for PSCs to step in and fill the gap with their specific 
skill set so desperately needed.  (Avant, 2006)  
In Eastern Europe alone, the largest employer of trained military 
professionals in the world, the Soviet Union, began ‘laying people off’ by the hundreds of 
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thousands effectively flooding the market with unemployed soldiers.  To compound the 
issue, the implosion of the entire Baltic region and states such as Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia created border unrest and set conditions ripe for future conflicts.    (P. W. 
Singer, 2003) 
Robert Mandel points out the effect that Cold War cessations had on the 
availability, shipment and possession of small arms across the world.  In his book, 
Armies Without States, Mandel states that national governments still maintain the 
advantage of fire power and the exacting sciences associated with it by continuing to 
posses the larger surface to surface and air to surface weapons.  They are, however, in the 
minority when it comes to the types of small arms used in low intensity conflicts 
indicative of a post superpower world.  The cross-border clandestine transfer of light 
weapons seen in the 1980s retained its momentum in the 1990s with the excess capacity 
in arms production combined with the greater visibility of internal state turmoil fostering 
intensified competition by arms produces to enter foreign markets.  The result was PSCs 
now had access to former military weaponry perfectly designed to outfit their former 
military employees who filled their ranks.  (Mandel, 2002) 
For recently unemployed professional soldier, options for employment 
dwindled.  With no state sponsored military to provide for the individual, the natural 
draw was to privately financed, equipped, owned and operated military firms who the 
demand for was on the rise.   
 
b. Transitions in Warfare 
Transformation in the nature of war had taken place.  This transformation 
blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians.  Military power in many countries had 
moved from the hands of the state to the private market and away from government 
oversight and management.  After the Vietnam War, American weapon inventories were 
increasingly stocked with high tech, sophisticated systems.  The gravitation towards these 
weapons slowly shifted a large power base from the military to the PSC, because, now 
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the military was increasingly relying upon contracted technical support for training, 
maintenance and operation. (Avant, 2006)   
The use of information technology has also drastically changed the nature 
of war.  Private companies and civilians have become better able to take advantage of the 
rapidly changing technological environment to wage an information campaign on 
potential adversaries.  (P. W. Singer, 2003) 
 
c. Privatization of Governmental Activities 
Finally, many governments succumbed to an ideological trend toward 
privatization of many of their functions.  Many former state responsibilities—including 
education, policing, and the operation of prisons—were turned over to the marketplace.  
(P. W. Singer, 2003)   
Central governments and their ability and/or desire to effectively manage 
their own countries lead to this form of arm’s length governance.  Instead of investing 
capital to bolster from the inside out, these governments placed the control of their own 
state in the hands of non-state actors.  As noted above, functions such as law 
enforcement, corrections and education are, from the American perspective, 
governmental functions to be managed and overseen for the greater good of the nation.  
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular A76 outlines the policies and 
procedures that executive branch agencies must use in identifying commercial-type 
activities and determining whether these activities are best provided by the private sector, 
by government employees, or by another agency through a fee-for-service agreement.  
(OMB, 2003)  With little to no legislation and few historical examples to draw from, 
many fledgling or former Soviet Union satellite countries simply outsourced their 
country’s most basic functions including defense and security. 
The experience of the former Soviet Union has been repeated on a smaller 
scale in the United States.  The post-cold war draw down of forces in the United States 
also left many experienced military forces without employment.  This exodus of trained 
soldiers gave rise to many of the American based PSCs such as Blackwater. 
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The results of just one of the above three elements alone did not lead to 
the modern PSC.  Rather, in a sum total effect, the modern PSC was born more or less 
out of fortunate timing.  Excess supplies of personnel, weapons, and equipment coupled 
with dynamic changes in how states managed domestic and foreign affairs lead to set the 
conditions from which PSCs could operate and function as stand alone entities.   
 
3. PSC Usage by Other Countries 
The use of PSCs has become so pervasive and the market in such demand, there 
seems to be no place on the planet not within reach of their services.  From third world 
countries in Africa and New Guinea to modern battlefields of the Balkans and the Middle 
East, PSCs have arrived with a seemingly endless kit bag of weapons, tactics and 
personnel. 
 
a. PSCs Actively Wage War 
Executive Outcomes was a South African PSC made up mostly of the 
disbanded South African elite and battle tested 32nd Battalion.  Known as the ‘Terrible 
Ones’, the 32nd Battalion turned private and became the world renowned, though 
controversial, Executive Outcomes.  Brandishing former Soviet hardware such as Mi 17 
and Mi-24 Hind E attack helicopters and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers, Executive 
Outcomes provided the potential buyer with the fire power rivaling that of most third 
world countries.  (Francis, 1999)  
In March of 1995 the small African country of Sierra Leone gave the 
world its first real exposure to the modern PSC and its wide range of capabilities.  In 
April of 1995, the government of Sierra Leone failed to defeat the local rebel faction 
calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  With time running out and RUF 
forces rapidly closing in on the Sierra Leone Capital of Freetown, the government turned 
to the private market for assistance.  Executive Outcomes, having just accomplished a 
dramatic but understated ‘victory’ in Angola, agreed to provide its full range of services 
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to Sierra Leone in exchange for over $1.2 million per month salary and mining 
concessions in Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond fields.   
Their forces began to arrive in Sierra Leone within one month’s time with 
plans to implement a three phase operation to take back the country.  Phase I included the 
eviction of RUF forces from the peripheral districts of Freetown.  Phase II incorporated 
securing lucrative diamond mines and finally phase III entailed destruction of RUF 
headquarters   Through the use of artillery, fixed and rotary wing close air support and 
mechanized infantry attacks, Executive Outcomes took just nine days to drive the RUF 
back into the jungles and another two days to retake the lucrative diamond fields.  
(Francis, 1999) 
Examples such as this and others involving PSCs actively hiring 
themselves out for offensive combat operations demonstrate the lengths to which many 
firms will go to fill the demand now levied on the PSC market.  Executive Outcomes was 
eventually forced to dissolve only to re-surface under a different name, but essentially the 
same leadership.  As long as a demand for combat operations exists, there will be firms 
willing to fill that demand.  Executive Outcomes, is just one of many willing to do so. 
 
b. PSCs as Consultants 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) provides yet another 
example of how PSCs have changed the scope of a country’s approach to waging war.  
MPRI is an American based consultant firm founded in 1987 and located in Alexandria, 
VA, just a few short minutes from the Pentagon.  Staffed by many retired American 
general and flag officers, MPRI has maintained a close relationship with the DoD and 
American foreign policy.   
In 1994-1995 MPRI was hired by the Croatian Ministry of Defense on two 
separate contracts.  The first was designed to provide the Croatian Ministry of Defense 
with long term strategic capabilities and the second to implement what came to be known 
as a Democratic Transition Assistance Program (DTAP).  The underlying premise for 
MPRI’s involvement in Croatia was to transform the Croatian army into a modern North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) style force.  In August of 1995, Croatian forces 
launched an offensive that, if presented to the NATO staff college in North America or 
Western Europe, would have “scored an A plus.”   (P. W. Singer, 2003) 
Not long after the closure of their Croatian contract, MPRI bid for and was 
awarded a $50 million contract with neighboring Bosnia for a ‘train and equip’ mission.  
Their intent in the region was to provide the Bosnian military with enough combat 
training and guidance to ensure a stabilized force that would prevent future acts of 
aggression from the Serbs.  (P. W. Singer, 2003) As a result, MPRI would remain 
imbedded in the region for years to come. 
It is important to understand the significance of the American based firm 
MPRI.  Far from the shores of Africa or the chaotic and turbulent governments in the 
South Pacific and Middle East, MPRI firmly stands its ground in the PSC market place 
less than a mile from the Pentagon.  American involvement in this market is significant.  
MPRI vehemently rejects accusations that their actions contradict US foreign policy.  
Lynch, 1997)  MPRI’s mere presence in the market, however, demonstrates that one need 
not go too far from the pinnacles of democracy and freedom to find PSCs operating 
profitably and legally. 
 
3. The DoD and PSCs 
The DoD is not a new customer to the PSC industry.  Like countries all over the 
world, American dependence on contractors has increased dramatically over the past 10 
years.  Among some of the more prominent PSCs found in support of US forces are 
Blackwater and AEGIS Defence.  Though the following is only a small sample of PSC 
currently on the market it demonstrates the depth of contractor involvement on America’s 
modern battlefields. 
 
a. Blackwater USA  
Without question the best known of all PSCs is Myock, NC based 
Blackwater USA.  Blackwater was founded in 1987 by former US Navy Seal, Eric 
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Prince.  While serving primarily as a security provider in the continental US, 
Blackwater’s portfolio expanded rapidly following the events of September 11, 2001.  
Consisting mostly of former US Special Operations Command members, Blackwater 
quickly earned the reputation as the most professional and aggressive PSC in the 
industry.   
In 2003, Blackwater was awarded a $21 million security contract to 
provide private security details for CPA employees, including the US administrator, L. 
Paul Bremer, and other VIPs visiting Iraq.  On March 31, 2004 Blackwater became a 
household name when four of its employees were killed while escorting vehicles 
dispatched to pick up kitchen supplies near Fallujah.  In the ensuing civil unrest, two of 
the four bodies were hung from a local bridge after being mutilated and burned beyond 
recognition.  (Mangini, 2005)  
 
b. AEGIS Defence Services 
The British security firm AEGIS is led and inspired by Mr. Tim Spicer.  A 
twenty year veteran of the British Army, former Scots Guard officer, Sandhurst graduate 
and a veteran of the Falkland's War, conflicts in Northern Ireland and Bosnia.  In May of 
2004 AEGIS competitively bid for and was subsequently awarded a contract requiring 
the firm to stand up and maintain an operations center in support of the reconstruction 
phase in Iraq.  The contract specified two general requirements.  First, AEGIS was to 
establish and maintain the reconstruction operations center (ROC), a turn key solution 
designed to provide oversight, de-confliction and battlespace management for the 
thousands of contractors and military personnel operating in Iraq and often right next to 
each other.  Second, AEGIS was to provide security teams for designated US government 
members in Iraq.  This more traditional personal security detachment would provide safe 
passage to all Project and Contracting Office (PCO) and ROC personnel while executing 
their reconstruction duties.  (Mangini, 2005)  AEGIS’s role as a US contracted PSC will 





From law enforcement operations on the US-Mexican border and in post 
conflict Iraq to counter drug operations in Columbia, the US Government’s reliance on 
Dyncorp has been one of the better kept secrets in the PSC industry.  The Reston, VA 
based contractor provides more than the typical PSC-like services.  Its heavily armed 
security details and security consultants provide excellent examples of American use of 
PSCs.  In Iraq, DynCorp’s employees routinely escort US Department of State employees 
throughout the country.  As outlined by the corporate watch dog group CorpWatch:  
 
The US State Department awarded DynCorp a multimillion-dollar contract 
to advise the Iraqi government on setting up effective law enforcement, 
judicial and correctional agencies. DynCorp will arrange for up to 1,000 
US civilian law enforcement experts to travel to Iraq to help locals "assess 
threats to public order" and mentor personnel at the municipal, provincial 
and national levels. 
Already armed DynCorp employees make up the core of the police force 
in Bosnia. DynCorp troops protect Afghan president Hamid Karzai, while 
DynCorp planes and pilots fly the defoliation missions over the coca crops 
in Colombia. Back home in the United States Dyncorp is in charge of the 
border posts between the US and Mexico, many of the Pentagon's 
weapons-testing ranges and the entire Air Force One fleet of presidential 
planes and helicopters. The company also reviews security clearance 
applications of military and civilian personnel for the Navy.   
(CorpWatch, 2005) 
 
The depth and breadth of the services provided by PSCs to the federal 
government is staggering and often misunderstood.  As shown by these three examples 
above, Blackwater, AEGIS and DynCorp, the American use of PSCs is well documented 






E. PSCS ACCOMPANYING THE FORCE 
The DoD must consider the negative externalities associated with outsourcing.  
The following list is not all encompassing, but will briefly discuss three main concerns 
with outsourcing.  First, combat and combat operations support is to be taken up by 
uniformed personnel.  The modern battlefield has changed such that contractors are 
increasingly being caught in compromising positions and in many cases losing their lives 
because of it.  Second, outsourcing requires a great deal of oversight to preclude 
opportunistic behavior.  The US government is not in a position to provide such extensive 
oversight at this time.  Third, in combat operations command and control are vital to 
mission success and the security of the force.  Inside the US military, this is a mantra 
taught to officers from day one of officer training, but not the case with a civilian run 
organization.   
 
1. PSCs in Unsupportable Positions  
On the non-linear battlefields of the modern way of warfare, every participant has 
the potential to be targeted on the frontline.  Contractors are no exception.  Without 
proper coordination and communication, contractors assume risks exceeding that of 
normal military units.  They stand out from both soldiers and locals by what they wear, 
what they drive, what they look like and how they act.  They are easily identified and 
targeted.  (Mangini, 2005)  
In April of 2004, a New York Times article by, Dana Priest, wrote the following 
regarding the isolation many private security contractors deal with and the sometimes 
deadly results:   
 
While US and coalition military forces fought rebellions in a half-dozen 
cities yesterday, the body of a contract worker, employed to guard the 
power lines of the Iraqi ministry of electricity, was extracted from a 
rooftop in Kut by his firm's Iraqi interpreter after he bled to death, 
according to government and industry officials.  The dead man, a Western 
employee of London-based Hart Group Ltd., had been pinned down on the 
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rooftop of the house he and four colleagues had been occupying Tuesday 
night when insurgents overran the house. The other four were wounded.  
"We were holding out, hoping to get direct military support that never 
came," said Nick Edmunds, Iraq coordinator for Hart, whose employees 
were operating in an area under Ukrainian military control. Other sources 
said Hart employees called US and Ukrainian military forces so many 
times during the siege that the battery on their mobile phone ran out.  
(Priest, 2004)  
 
The incident clearly displays the types of situations contractors are increasingly 
encountering.  The responsibility of ensuring the safety of employees rests solely in the 
hands of the PSC firm.  Contrary to what Priest advocates above, it is not the military’s 
job to respond to every ‘911’ like call for help. 
What is also very telling about the incident above is the fact that the PSC 
employees were inside of a non-American sector of Iraq.  The challenges surrounding 
PSC management and command and control involve more than just Americans.  In areas 
controlled by allied forces, problems (communications equipment, lack of common 
terminology etc) associated with PSCs become amplified and even more difficult to 
solve.   
 
2. Oversight and Accountability   
PSCs are not tracked and controlled by any single organization inside the DoD.  
Since the PSC industry is inherently complex and difficult to evaluate, a robust 
monitoring and surveillance plan would be necessary.  For example, the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA), the Federal Government’s lead agent for matters such as 
this, would be required to drastically increase its capacity to handle this increased load.  
This would be a considerable effort since DCMA has suffered massive downsizing over 
recent years.  Since 1990, the agency has cut its workforce from 25,000 to 11,500 
employees and saw the number of those eligible for retirement increase to over 50% by 
the year 2005.  (Cahlink, 2005) 
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3. Command and Control   
As the proliferation of PSCs in Iraq reaches a fever pitch, and US involvement 
becomes more hotly contested at home and abroad, the issue of command and control 
becomes more critical.  The inherent lack of coordination and communication between 
PSCs and local military commanders resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilian 
contractors, forced local commanders into undesirable tactical positions and provided a 
face to the American occupation that most military commander would rather not show.    
Regardless of the fact that PSCs are not part of the military, they do represent the 
DoD, and their actions. Even their presence represents the American war machine and 
US foreign policy.  In Iraq, formal rules of engagement and support of the bigger picture 
do not apply to PSCs.  Their purpose is to support their employer.  Their actions on the 
roads and in the cities of Iraq have been described as cowboy-like by those who have 
seen their work.  (Mangini, 2005)  PSCs are not required to coordinate with adjacent 
military commanders on the ground.   
Proof of success in coordinating unit activity does exist.  According to a former 
Marine Corps Operations Officer in Iraq’s Al Anbar Province, military convoys within a 
battlespace were conducted regularly with little to no incident.  Coordination between 
adjacent units was required for mission success and done on a routine basis.  The same 
could not be said for PSC escorted convoys.  Often, the presence of a PSC security detail 
was announced by explosions, gun shots and frantic calls for assistance.  As a result, the 
local commander was required to commit a sizable portion of his already thin force to 
assist the unannounced guests, often times taking fire from the very persons they were 
rescuing.  (Styskal, 2006) 
Dr. Pete Singer had this to say regarding command and control of PSCs and the 
fundamental and inherent risks inside of a battlespace: 
 
Unity of command may be a fundamental concept, but in Iraq, it is already 
lost. Officers must worry about armed forces operating within their sector 
of responsibility but outside the bounds of their authority. Many of these 
contractors work directly for the CPA, which coordinates and 
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communicates only on a limited basis with the normal US military chain 
of command. Others work for entities other than the CPA, such as 
construction firms and media companies. Thus, local military commanders 
are often unaware of the daily actions of firms in their zones of 
responsibility. This disconnect is not just a simple point of discomfort for 
officers.   “Friendly fire” incidents have even broken out between 
contractor and coalition convoys.   
(P. W. Singer, 2005) 
  
Both Styskal’s and Singer’s comments strike at the heart of the PSC command 
and control issue and will be discussed in further detail later in this paper.  PSCs 
that operate autonomously and without regard to other battlefield entities are a 
danger to themselves, their clients and every adjacent military unit. 
 
F. PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS 
Research conducted by Maj. Karen Douglas identified the commander’s lack of 
emergency control authority as a major weakness in acquisition policy and recommended 
a change be made to the DFARS to grant this authority.(Douglas, 2004)  This 
recommendation was reviewed by the DoD and Congress and subsequently rejected. 
(Merriman, 2006) 
Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to 
Accompany the US Armed Forces, was issued in October, 2005 to address many issues 
surrounding contractor support in Iraq and Afghanistan.  On the topic of emergency 
authority, the instruction states:  
 
Defense contractors are responsible for ensuring employees perform under 
the terms of the contract; comply with theater orders, and applicable 
directives, laws, and regulations; and maintain employee discipline. The 
contracting officer, or designee, is the liaison between the commander and 
the defense contractor for directing or controlling contractor performance 
because commanders have no direct contractual relationship with the 
defense contractor. However, the ranking military commander may, in 
emergency situations (e.g., enemy or terrorist actions or natural disaster), 
direct contingency contractor personnel to take lawful action as long as 
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those actions do not require them to assume inherently governmental 
responsibilities  
(Department of Defense, 2005).   
 
Granting emergency control authority to the local commander is a good first step 
toward formalizing the relationship between the contractor and the supported unit. It does 
not, however, address the majority of command issues faced by commanders.  
Emergency control authority does nothing to address the more mundane control issues 
that arise on a daily basis and are compounded by the lack of communication between 
commanders and the contracting officer.  Emergency authority essentially gives the 
commander the authority to tell the contractors where to take cover during an attack and 
nothing else.  The commander is prohibited from using the contractors to augment his 
defense by article 13 of the Hague Convention and article 4 of the Geneva Conventions 
which both establish that contractors would become illegal combatants if they were to 
take an active role in combat operations.   
In an attempt to centralize control of PSC activities, coalition forces established 
the Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC).  The ROC provides a centralized node for 
command and control for PSC representatives operating in Iraq.  Similar to high level US 
military combat operations centers, the ROC’s goal is to provide enemy and coalition 
situations, intelligence updates as well as any recent political events deemed relevant to 
PSC operations.  Participation in the ROC, however, is not required either legally or 
contractually.  (Mangini, 2005) 
In response to the March 2004 killings of the four Blackwater employees, 
Coalition Provisional Authority memorandum 17 (CPA 17) was issued in June of 2004 
and signed by then CPA administrator, Paul Bremer.  The intent behind the memorandum 
was well founded.  It set out to standardize the manner in which PSC providers are 
registered, regulated and vetted.  The memorandum provides specific guidance on the use 
of force, weapons safety and the code of conduct expected of PSC providers in Iraq.  
(Bremer, 2004)  Though published and put into writing, many within the industry do not 





The essence of contract law, as it emerged in its modern form in the 19th
 
Century, was freedom of contract; and the very definition of a contract 
was that of legally enforceable promises.  In contracting, individuals (on 
behalf of themselves or the organizations they represent) freely make 
promises in a manner that creates legal obligations—creates law—
between them. This creates a relationship among the people affected by 
the contract, particularly in service contracting. Inter-personal 
relationships and the identification of a community of interest may play a 
key role in the successful management and control of contract 
performance in contingency operations.   
(Dunn, 2005)   
 
One of the reasons private sector contractors can be efficient and profitable is the 
freedom from a rigid command and control structure.  Forcing restrictions onto these 
companies may destroy the economic benefits gained from outsourcing services and in 
effect drive away competition as PSCs will seek other employers who do not impose the 
same restrictions.  The argument has also been made that there is no need to alter current 
policy because the flow of services has continued unabated despite minor setbacks. 
(Dunn, 2006) 
Two hundred and thirty one years of US military history have firmly established 
the fact that contracting service support is a mixed blessing.  It allows military 
commanders to focus their efforts on warfighting functions and leverages the economic 
benefits of private-sector businesses.  It also creates a complicated command and control 
situation, increases potential for service disruptions and puts critical support services 
under the control of civilians. 
Military traditionalists might advocate the elimination of reliance on contractors 
by increasing organic service capability. This is not a realistic option in the era of reduced 
forces and the need to create efficiencies under the Government Performance Results 
Act.  The days of maintaining a large force structure to support seldom used functions are 
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over.  Contractor support is now a fact of military operations.  The DoD is engaging in a 
successful effort to adapt warfighting strategies to the asymmetric battlefield.  It is now 
time for the DoD to extend that adaptation to its policies on the command and control of 
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III. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS  
A.   OVERVIEW  
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which 
action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. 
. . . The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; 
which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, 
because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.   
(MCDP 6) 
Since the initial invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, the private security industry’s 
relationship with the military has gone through highs and lows.  There have been 
countless times when PSC operations have integrated flawlessly with military operations.  
There have also been numerous occasions when the relationship has been almost 
adversarial, with both sides refusing to communicate or coordinate with the other.    
This tenuous relationship has been brought to the forefront by situations such as 
one that occurred in May of 2005.  A convoy of technical personnel from the American 
based firm Zapata Engineering escorted by a PSC was transiting through the dangerous 
streets of Fallujah.  After repairing a flat tire on one of their sport utility vehicles, their 
convoy was stopped by a Marine patrol and questioned regarding an incident involving a 
nearby Marine observation post.  When asked if the convoy had fired on the nearby 
Marine guard tower, the convoy’s commander denied involvement.  Unconvinced, the 
Marine Officer on the scene ordered the 16 American security guards and three Iraqi 
maintenance workers into custody.    Three days later, all 19 in custody were released, 
but not without significant backlash from their family members in the United States, 
many of whom have since hired attorneys in preparation for legal suits.  (Phinney, 2005)   
Could this incident and others like this in Iraq, have been prevented or at least 
mitigated?  Did Zapata know where the Marine guard towers were?  Did the Marines 
know there was a contractor convoy transiting though their battlespace that day?   
According to the National Defense Authorization Act fiscal year 2005, US 
military forces have no command and control relationship over private security 
contractors working in Iraq.  (GAO, 2005) With no defined control relationship in such a 
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dangerous environment, problems have risen regarding who is in charge of whom and 
ultimately who gives way to whom inside an actively managed battlespace. 
Coordination between the military and PSCs has evolved greatly since the 
beginning of the stability and reconstruction phase in Iraq.  Initially, informal means were 
used to pass information and coordinate movements.  Examples range from face-to-face 
discussions in mess halls on board US installations to actual briefs in unit operations 
centers.  According to several US Army officers and PSCs interviewed by GAO, the 
results and techniques were inconsistent and often depended on the personalities of those 
involved in the discussion.  According to several Marine Operations Officers 
interviewed, PSC presence in their battlespace was often not known until they were 
observed by patrols or calls for help were received.   
In more extreme cases cited by other Marine officers, PSC escorted convoys 
would travel unannounced through a military unit’s AOR and come under attack by 
insurgent forces or fall victim to an improvised explosive device (IED).  In one case, the 
contractor’s convoy split from the lead half leaving the damaged tail elements behind.  
The result was that one of the civilian drivers was abducted by insurgents.   This incident 
caused the Marine unit to cease all current and planned operations, provide a quick 
reaction force, set up vehicle checkpoints and sweep the surrounding areas to look for the 
driver who, incidentally, was never found.  The same contractor convoy, this time 
escorted by Marine Corps forces, received contact on the way back to the base.  Without 
positive identification of targets the civilian security personnel returned fire back in the 
general direction of their attackers and actually shot a coalition outpost wounding several 
civilians. (Bitanga, 2006)  
 
No single activity in war is more important than command and control.  
Command and control by itself will not drive home a single attack against 
an enemy force.  It will not destroy a single enemy target.  It will not 
effect a single emergency re-supply.  Yet none of these essential 
warfighting activities, or any others, would be possible without effective 
command and control.  Without command and control, campaigns, battles 
and organized engagements are impossible, military units degenerate into 
mobs and subordination of military forces to policy is replaced by random 
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violence.  In short, command and control is essential to all military 
operations and activities.   
(MCDP 6) 
 
Though MCDP 6 speaks specifically about military operations, these principles 
can and should be applied to any large scale operation that requires the coordinated 
efforts of multiple agencies.  At layers deep beneath the surface of the large scale 
reconstruction efforts, over 60 private security companies are operating in Iraq.  Many of 
these PSCs operate without coordination and with little regard for adjacent units or 
reconstruction efforts overall.   This chapter will identify and analyze several factors that 




During December of 2003, selected members of the US Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), Project and Contracting Office (PCO) and the Iraqi Ministry developed a 
comprehensive list of projects designed to get Iraq back on its feet following initial 
combat operations.  In January of 2004, the US Congress approved this project list, and 
authorized and appropriated $18.4B towards its end.  Reconstruction was officially 
underway.  (Schweitzer, 2006)  
The principle agency charged with the management of the $18.4B in 
reconstruction funds was the PCO.  According to the PCO’s website, their stated mission 
is, “To serve the people of the United States and Iraq by contracting for and delivering 
services, supplies, and infrastructure identified within the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund, a total $18.4 billion in resources allocated by the US Congress on behalf of the 
American taxpayers for rebuilding Iraq.”  In short, the PCO took the lead in rebuilding 
Iraq. 
During the initial stages of reconstruction, civil/military operations experienced a 
relative calm throughout the country. Only limited and sporadic fighting occurred from 
time to time in and around areas predominantly loyal to Saddam.  As reconstruction 
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contracts were let and the $18.4B began to fund contracts, private contractors began work 
all over Iraq.  With time, the insurgency gathered strength and began exploiting the 
relatively unprotected convoys and job sites of contracted firms.  Coalition forces were 
stretched thin focusing on their own force protection, and had little time or personnel to 
devote to protecting civilians on the battlefield.  (Bush, 2006) 
 
2. Actions at the Sub-Contractor Level 
Problems involving PSCs by and large are found within the maze of sub-contracts 
trickling down from each prime contractor.  In the ensuing gold rush-like dash to begin 
and maintain reconstruction, prime contractors were awarded contracts with very little 
oversight or concern on the part of the federal government regarding sub-contracting 
plans.   
a. Core Competencies 
Though the prime contractor was overall responsible for executing the 
sometimes un-definitized contract awarded, sub-contractors often performed work not 
associated with the prime contractor’s core competency.  In a May 1990 Harvard 
Business Review, Prahalad and Hamel declare that a company’s competitiveness is a 
result of its core competencies and its core products.  According to them,  
 
[c]ore competencies are the collective learning in the organization, 
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate 
multiple streams of technologies.   
 
Core competencies are, in Prahalad and Hamel’s opinion, a company’s 
critical resource and should be the focus for its strategy at corporate level (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990).  
With private security being a non-core competency for many contractors, 
prime contractors and sub-contractors hired an array of PSCs to protect company 
personnel, job sites and equipment.  Many times this was done without first consulting 
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with the contracting officer.  The lines of authority and control blurred as contract actions 
extended deeper into multiple tiers of sub-contracts and further away from prime 
contractor and contracting officer control.  The result was that PSCs were being 
contracted without the knowledge or approval of a government contracting officer.  With 
no way of enforcing the requirement for prime contractors to report sub-contracting 
actions or changes, the prolific hiring of and uncoordinated actions of PSCs was well 
underway.  
  
b. Lack of Transparency Noted by GAO 
A 2005 GAO report identified a lack of oversight when it analyzed the 
tracking and accounting of costs associated with PSCs by contracting agencies and prime 
contractors.  Though specifically focused on cost accounting and specific cost elements, 
GAO found a general lack of interest by prime contractors involving sub-contracted 
actions that did not significantly affect project schedule or cost.  GAO concluded that 
reconstruction contractors did not always specifically track security related costs or the 
actions of PSCs by their sub-contractors or lower tier suppliers.  (GAO, 2005)   
 
c. Contract Language 
As the contracting environment evolved and the theater matured, so too 
did efforts to address issues surrounding the actions of sub-contractors in the language of 
contracts.  In a sample of contracts awarded by the PCO via the Joint Contracting 
Command Iraq (JCC-I)5 the following language could be found in section C, Statement 
of Work:  
 
Contractor shall provide security for all work. This includes all costs 
associated with protection of contractor and US Government employees 
from the actions of terrorists and criminals. Protection of base camps, 
protection of workers at all of job sites, security escort to facilitate 
 
5 Joint Contracting Command Iraq (JCC-I) was stood up in 2005 with the intended purpose to provide 
strategic and operational level coordination and direction to the contracting efforts throughout Iraq 
 46
movement of personnel and equipment, hardening of facilities, 
procurement of hardened vehicles and procurement of protective gear, 
following PCO Security Directorate recommendations to, and discussion 
with, the contractor’s Security Manager, are included.  Offerors are to be 
aware of the special security situation in Fallujah, and are to identify and 
include for any special badging and identification requirements necessary 
for entry to the area.  Note that the United States Marine Corps operate 
throughout the city of Fallujah. During the performance of the contract, 
close coordination of vehicle movements and other activities in areas 
associated with this scope of work MUST be coordinated through the 
USACE Resident Office with the responsible military unit. Besides 
personnel badging, other requirements may include detailed instructions 
for vehicle speeds, signaling, documentation, and operating times.   
(JCC-I, 2005) 
 
Section H, Special Contract Requirements, of the same contract, addresses 
the issue of security slightly different from what is seen above.  Here, the contracting 
officer’s language addresses the need for contractors to report any contractor personnel 
who carry weapons and that this clause shall flow down to all tiers of the contract: 
 
Contractor personnel are required to obtain approval from the Contracting 
Officer prior to carrying or possessing weapons within the borders of Iraq 
for any purpose. These requirements do not apply to the shipment of 
ammunition or weapons contained in the original factory shipping 
containers.  This policy applies to all levels of subcontracted personnel 
and this clause shall be included in all subcontracts issued for work 
performed within Iraq.  
(JCC-I, 2006)   
 
Both of the above passages outline JCC-I’s efforts to ensure three things.  
First, the contracting officer is made aware of any and all actions of PSCs at the sub-
contractor level.  Second, these clauses effectively flow down from the prime to all sub-
contractors.  Finally, it is imperative for the contractor to seek out and coordinate with 
agents of the USACE, PCO and the local military commander.  This language puts the 
prime contactor firmly responsible for PSC actions at all tiers, however, it does so in the 
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form of a term or condition written for these particular contracts from this particular 
contracting agency. 
In other contracts awarded by JCC-I as early as October and November of 
2005 and as recently as July 2006, security is addressed via a contract line item (CLIN) 
or when referencing the scope of work to be performed by stating:  
 
The Contractor shall provide all necessary security to successfully deliver 
the [ET-015 CPS 132kV SUBSTATIONS… ]6
(JCC-I, 2005) 
 
d. Contract Trends 
Of the contracts sampled spanning the period July 2005 to September 
2006 several trends were noted.  First, language and verbiage related to security 
dramatically increased over the period sampled.  The elevation of threats and insurgent 
activity certainly explain this.  Second, each mention of the contractor’s responsibility 
relating to security was done so in varying levels of detail, remained random and lacked 
standardized language or location within the contract itself. 
The visibility of actions at the subcontract level is greatly reduced and 
often times ignored as a result of extensive and complex sub-contracting plans.  The lack 
of transparency has allowed sub-contractors to operate without proper coordination.  
Currently there is no mechanism for the contracting community as a whole to convey a 
standardized, contractual requirement regarding security, PSC management and 
coordination at the sub-contracting level.  Without a standardized method, contracting 





6 The language before the section [ET-015 CPS 132kV SUBSTATIONS…] is routinely copied into 
JCC-I contracts. 
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3. Lack of Pre-Existing Doctrine for Command and Control 
As incidents of blue on white7 rose, the following questions began to surface:   
Who would coordinate movements of the large volume of PSCs in Iraq with other 
reconstruction efforts?  How would ongoing offensive operations of coalition forces be 
affected by PSCs moving throughout Iraqi battlespace?   
OIF was and remains unique.  Following what was thought to be the cessation of 
offensive operations on May 1, 2003, the United States set into motion its plan to rebuild 
Iraq.  Though the intent was clear, the mechanisms to take on such a hefty task were not.  
Doctrine did not provide any answers to a reconstruction problem as large and complex 
as postwar Iraq.  According to Colonel (Ret) Joseph Schweitzer,8 the compiling and 
prioritizing of reconstruction projects did not even begin until December of 2003 and was 
not confirmed by Congress until January 2004.  There simply was no doctrine or 
precedence from which to begin planning and executing an operation of this magnitude.  
(Schweitzer, 2006) 
The lack of a solid plan for reconstruction operations resulted in the DoD and 
Department of State awarding thousands of contracts for various services in a very short 
period of time with very little oversight.  During 2004, hundreds of thousands of 
contractor personnel flowed into Iraq and Kuwait with little control.  This huge influx of 
contractors created an enormous burden on the DoD as it tried to keep track of these 
contractors and deconflict their actions with military forces. 
By May of 2004, the USACE, Gulf Region Division (GRD) and the PCO 
identified requirements for a centralized system of command and control capable of 
tracking and accounting for contactors and their efforts in Iraq.  With no pre-existing 
doctrine on contractor coordination or contracting support plans to fall back on and with 
time being of the essence, the USACE and the PCO turned to the private marketplace to 
 
7 Phrase used to describe battlefield engagements between coalition military forces (Blue) and PSCs 
(white).  (GAO, 2005) 
8 Colonel (Ret) Joseph Schweitzer, US Army.  Former Deputy G3 Operations Officer, Headquarters, 
US Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C. 
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fill the command and control void.  In the PCO’s request for proposal released in May of 
2004, the statement of work laid out for potential offerors identified the following: 
 
The Contractor shall provide all planning, mobilization and start-up for a 
comprehensive security management team that provides security program 
management, anti-terrorism support and analyses, movement/escort 
security and close personal protection.  The contractor will provide 
security advisors and planners to facilitate, coordinate and implement 
security requirements and contingency plans.  The contractor will be 
required to coordinate with local authorities (Coalition Provisional 
Authority, local police, other country police forces and US and other 
country military force) and plan route selection and sufficient coverage for 
the safe movement of personnel  (Statement of Work reconstruction 
security support services’  
(AEGIS, 2005)   
 
Throughout 2004, the command and control of PSCs and all reconstruction efforts 
remained fluid.  With no pre-existing doctrine or prior experience to draw from, the 
command and control of PSCs developed as a result of reactive measures taken to bring 
reconstruction under control.     
 
4.  Coordination, Command and Control of PSCs on the Battlefield  
Done well, command and control helps commanders make the most of 
what they have: people, information, material and often most important of 
all, time.   
(MCDP 6) 
 
a. Blue on White Incidents 
As mentioned earlier, one important issue that contractors and the military 
are concerned with is blue on white violence.  Blue on white incidents occur when either 
military forces fire upon contractors or when contractors fire upon military forces.  The 
GAO reports that these types of incidents display a significant lack of coordination 
between PSCs and the military.  Analysis conducted by the GAO in 2005 and again in 
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2006 show the number of blue on white incidents decreasing, but still remaining at a level 
of concern.  During a five month period from January to May 2005, twenty blue on white 
incidents were reported.  In another sample, this time of twelve months, the GAO found 
twelve incidents that were reported.  As noted by the GAO the actual number of incidents 
is difficult to know since many are simply dismissed as part of the job and not reported 
by PSCs.  (GAO, 2006) 
Conclusions from the GAO’s analysis are straightforward.  Clashes 
between PSCs and military forces are happening all over Iraq.  Though the numbers seem 
insignificant and appear to be declining, there remains work to be done in the areas of 
coordination, command and control.   
 
b. Organizational Structure of the National ROC  
As noted by the GAO, on a daily basis in Iraq, a major shortfall of the 
reconstruction effort was command and control.  To best provide the level of 
coordination, command and control for the reconstruction efforts, the PCO and USACE 
officers designed a model based on a military operations center and formed around two 
separate tiers of operation; the first at the national level with the second at regional levels 
in direct support of reconstruction and military efforts.   
The National ROC (NROC), located in the heart of Baghdad’s 
international zone, is set up and run very much like a military operations center.  Inside 
the NROC, as seen in Figure 1, a staff manned with personnel from each staff functional 
area9, including PSCs and the military liaisons, work to coordinate the efforts of 
contractors in support of the overall reconstruction effort.  (Schweitzer, 2006) 
Figure 1 shows the breakout and functional areas of the NROC.  The 
NROC, even though manned and staffed by approximately 80% AEGIS contractors, 
resembles the high level staff of any American military component.  Of particular 
importance is the C-5 LNO or liaison officer functional area.  PSC liaisons provide the 




Figure 1.   NROC Participants 
Source:  From Col (Ret) Joe Schweitzer ROC presentation to MajGen Heine 
 
c. NROC Capabilities 
Joint Publications 1-02 defines an operations center as, “The facility or 
location on an installation, base, or facility used by the commander to command, control 
and coordinate all crisis activities.”   (JP 1-02)  The NROC’s intent was precisely this, to 
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9 Staff functional areas are generally laid out and organized with the following functional areas:  
administration, intelligence, operations, logistics and communications.  Higher level staffs may use 
additional functional areas such as plans and civil-military operations. 
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serve as the national headquarters for the reconstruction effort and as the nerve center of 
the command and control effort.   
Col (Ret) Joe Schweitzer served as director of the NROC from its 
inception in October 2004 to February 2005, and stated that the foundation of the ROC 
concept was to provide situational awareness, a common operating picture, and be the 
mechanism for both military and contractors alike to use to improve coordination during 
reconstruction.  According to Col Schweitzer, the ROC “provided unity of effort in the 
absence of unity of command.”   
As the de facto headquarters element of reconstruction, one of the 
NROC’s missions included remaining firmly plugged into operations at each of its five 
subordinate regional ROCs. (Described in the next section)   In coordinating the efforts of 
PSCs and military operations, the NROC functions in two primary ways: 
x Intelligence push:  The NROC collects unclassified intelligence from each of 
the five regions to provide an overall intelligence picture of the country, 
identifying trends and enemy tactics, techniques and procedures.  
Additionally, the NROC will push national level intelligence to include 
political, religious or economic information that may affect the operations of 
both PSCs and the military alike. (Schweitzer, 2006) 
x Consequence management assistance:  in the event that one of the subordinate 
Regional ROCs are not able to reach local military units in a crisis situation, 
the NROC serves as a backup.  Tied directly into the Multi National Forces 
Iraq (MNFI), the NROC is able to quickly request assistance in the form of 
the evacuation of injured personnel or quick reaction force.  (Schweitzer, 
2006) 
 
d. Organizational Structure of the Regional ROC (RROC) 
Even the best network and communications architecture cannot replace 
face-to-face coordination at the lowest level.  While the NROC is capable of providing an 
overall picture of reconstruction and assisting in the coordination of PSCs and MSCs, it is 
not capable of working directly with tactical commanders on day-to-day operations.  For 
this reason, the RROCs were established and operated in conjunction with MSCs in that 
unit’s AOR.   
The regional tier places a RROC in each of Iraq’s five main reconstruction 
zones.  To facilitate face-to-face communication, RROC locations were co-located with 
the MSC headquarters and structured according to Figures 2 and 3 below.  
Of the five RROCs seen in Figure 2, three are operated by US forces.  
Baghdad and Mosul RROCs coincide with US Army division AORs while the Fallujah 
RROC maintains a habitual relations ship with either I or II Marine Expeditionary Force.  
The remaining two RROCs match with coalition partners Poland in Diwaniyah and the 
Great Britain in Basrah.   
 
Figure 2.   RROC Layout 




Figure 3.   RROC Locations and Approximate MSC AORs 
Source: From  http://members.cox.net/intelbriefing/Iraq_Map.jpg and GAO, 2005 
 
Figure 3 shows the locations of each of the RROCs and the approximate 
boundaries associated with each co-located MSC.  For PSCs and MSCs, the RROC is 
where the rubber meets the road and where policy is put into practice on a daily basis.  As 
both figures show, the five RROCs coordinate their efforts within their respective zones.  
(GAO, 2005)  
 
e. RROC Capabilities 
The interface between MSC and PSC, the RROC provides many key 
services, three of which are outlined below:   
First, is the sharing of intelligence information.  As the central repository 
of all information, the RROC acts as a collection activity of intelligence pushed from the 
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NROC, the military and other PSCs operating in Iraq.  Through a process of 
declassification, MSC liaison officers provide local, unclassified intelligence to the 
RROC for dissemination to contractors.  Likewise, PSCs that operate in the local area 
provide the same.  The intelligence picture is updated daily via password protected 
websites and phone conversations between headquarters and briefings with the MSC.  
Intelligence updates and analysis are provided upon request as well as for specific sites or 
routes.   
Often times PSCs are familiar with areas not traveled by traditional 
military forces.  In these cases, excellent firsthand intelligence can be garnered from the 
PSC. (GAO, 2005)  Possessing many former military special operations personnel, PSCs 
are often the best form of intelligence on the ground.  PSCs routinely provided detailed 
information on routes, enemy activity and in some cases have even video taped routes 
within certain areas of operations.  This information would be turned over to 
representatives at the RROCs for dissemination to other PSCs and MSCs.  (Schweitzer, 
2006) 
The RROC’s second main service involves communications and 
information flow between both PSCs and the military.  The lack of commonality of 
communications hardware greatly restricts direct communication via tactical channels.  
Tactical military communications operate using classified frequency sets and encryption 
keys enabling transmissions to be secure and free from intercept and/or jamming.  PSCs 
do not enjoy the same level of sophistication in their communications assets, therefore, it 
makes the two sides unable to communicate via secure means while operating.  Though 
both sides could communicate via un-encrypted radios, this is not the preferred method 
and done so only in emergency situations.    
The RROC alleviates many of these problems by being the center for both 
sides’ activities.  As described by AEGIS’s senior representative of the RROC in the Al 
Anbar Province, Mr. Guy Winter,10 a standardized process of route and mission clearance 
 
10 Mr. Guy Winter, at the time of this report, is 13 months in to an 18 month tour of duty as AEGIS’s 
senior representative in the Fallujah RROC. 
does exist with slight variations between each of the RROCs.  Figure 4 is indicative of 
those processes used by the MEF and its associated RROC in Fallujah.  (Winter, 2006) 
 
Figure 4.   PSC Movement Request Process 
Source: From Mr. Guy Winter 
 
Figure 4 shows the relatively simple process currently used by the Fallujah 
RROC and I MEF.  The process is done entirely by electronic, web based 
communications.  I MEF policy currently require that all requests be submitted no later 
than 72 hours before commencement of movement.  If a mission is denied and the PSC 
proceeds without authorization, the convoy will be turned around at one of a number of 
road checkpoints and any calls for assistance will be ignored. (Winter, 2006) 
If approved, PSCs are provided several key services in support of their 
mission.  First, contact numbers are given for each MSC affected by the PSC’s 
movement.  These numbers are generally cellular or satellite phones to be used in the 
event that un-secure communications are necessary.  Next, the RROC and imbedded 
MSC logistics movement control center (LMCC) ensure the affected MSCs are notified 
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of all pertinent data to include convoy route, size, description, destination, 
communications capability and any special requirements.   Third, RROCs have the 
capability to track and monitor convoys via attached global positioning systems that 
provide the center with real-time updates to PSC convoy locations.  In the event of an 
immediate need for assistance, these attached global positioning systems come equipped 
with a distress feature that can be activated by the PSC convoy commander without the 
need to pick up a handset or cell phone.    
Finally, and possibly the most important, the RROC is a PSC’s 911 
emergency call center.  On the dangerous roadways of Iraq, PSCs are challenged virtually 
every time they travel.  Problems on the road range from broken-down vehicles to 
engagements with anti-coalition forces and on occasion brushes with coalition forces.  In 
any of these cases, where military assistance is required, the RROC is capable of 
contacting the nearest unit to coordinate the support such as quick reaction force (QRF), 
evacuation of injured personnel, medical assistance, security and air support to name just 
a few.  (GAO, 2005)  The RROC also has the ability to contact the NROC for assistance 
if needed.   
The ROC system of command and control has evolved into a functioning 
mechanism that serves as a ‘go between’ for MSCs and PSCs.  MSCs, particularly the 
Marine Expeditionary Force in Al Anbar Province have embraced the RROC as a tool to 
be used to coordinate their efforts in their AOR.  MEF Future Operations Officers and 
planners who were interviewed reported the use of the RROC in weekly resource 
allocation working groups to validate and confirm civil affairs requests for consideration.  
(Wallace, 2006)   
The exchange of information seems to be limited to the above information 
however.  When asked about the de-confliction of the MEF’s offensive operations, any 
exchange of fire support plans or tactical control measures via the Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), both RROC and MEF personnel stated that 
the relationship has not evolved to this point yet since this would require the addition of 
more Marines to the RROC capable of taking possession of and declassifying operations 
orders, graphics and fire plans.   
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5. Staffing of the ROC System and Command Relationships 
While led and directed by an active duty US military officer, both the NROC and 
RROCs are run and manned by contracted AEGIS personnel accompanied by coalition 
and Iraqi liaison teams.  Each center’s responsibilities are carefully segregated between 
AEGIS contractors and military directors and liaisons.     
 
a. The Military Side of the ROC System 
Military personnel serve as directors of the ROC system, though according 
to one anonymous director this title is rather honorary and does not connote the authority 
to make any changes to ROC manning or operation.  The MSCs remain plugged into the 
ROC system through the use of liaisons and attached movement control cells.  The 
military director focuses heavily on actual reconstruction efforts associated with the 
particular region.  When asked about the formal command relationship that exists 
between AEGIS and the military director, one RROC director noted:  
 
I am technically the OIC or military sponsor of AEGIS, but they operate 
so well that I add very little value.  …they are so professional and good at 
their job that they really operate automatically.   
(Anonymous RROC director) 
 
To make matters more complicated, none of the directors interviewed for 
this project were contracting or acquisition professionals.  Once again, this left any 
decision regarding contract changes to a contracting officer who was often hundreds of 







b. The AEGIS Side of the ROC System 
As noted in a previous section, AEGIS personnel are primarily the 
operators inside the RROC and serve as the engine of coordination.  The AEGIS 
contractors control and manage the physical layout of the RROCs as well as conduct the 
actual face-to-face coordination with MSCs.  One AEGIS director was quick to point out 
that he does not control or direct any active duty military personnel.  Mr. Guy Winter 
noted the following when asked about his role and responsibility inside his RROC:  
 
From my perspective, I organize and run the physical RROC and provide 
the various functions that support the provision of a common operating 
picture. We therefore have an operations room with a tracking system (a 
civilian form of Blue Force tracker) for those PSCs that have signed up to 
GRD. I have a comms set-up and an intel capability to provide 
information on safe passage and threats. I organize the relationship with 
MEF for S2 and S3 so that they know what we are up to, and are kept up 
to speed on (non-tactical, non-military) movements through their battle 
space. This is done primarily through the MEF LMCC, who are now co-
located with my operations room.   
(Winter, 2006) 
 
Without question, AEGIS contracted personnel are conducting themselves 
professionally, effectively and with a high degree of distinction.  Even during the initial 
stand up period of the NROC and RROC in October of 2004, then NROC Director, Col 
Joe Schweitzer stated repeatedly how professional and capable the AEGIS contractors 
were.   
The problems encountered are not in the quality of the contracted work, 
but with the complex and often ambiguous chain of command inside which both 
contractors and military personnel are forced to work.  There simply is no one point of 
contact, or one officer in charge regarding all matters involving the ROC system.  Rather, 
the relationship between the two entities is on more of an even plain with no one entity 
truly able to direct the actions of the other.   
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Concerns also surface regarding the over indulgence and dependence on 
contracted help in this critical coordination function.  Of primary concern is the issue of 
default by a civilian contractor.  With over 80% of the ROC system run by AEGIS, the 
consequences of a breech of contract or walkout would be catastrophic to the operation of 
the ROC.   
Finally, there is the question of what will happen to the ROC system when 
AEGIS’ contract ends.  There is currently no military or DoD plan to assume the role of 
operating the ROC and there is no planning or training being conducted in preparation for 
the next conflict’s reconstruction phase.  
 
6. Contingency Contracting Planning and Oversight 
Many of the negative issues that have surrounded contingency contracting in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom can be tied to two central 
issues: a lack of effective deliberate planning for contracting operations and a lack of 
operational and strategic level oversight of contingency contracting officers. 
 
a. Deliberate Planning for Contingency Contracting 
Much has been written about the now infamous Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan (CCSP) included as part of the 1003V operations base plan.  It has been 
well documented that the CCSP was too broad and did not address specific issues of 
contract support.  According to the Contingency Contracting Student Handbook used at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, the following list provides a guide to the contents of the 
CCSP: 
x Command and control relationships. 
x Location and structure of the contracting office and sub offices, including 
which customers will be supported by each. 
x Procedures for appointing, training, and employing Ordering Officers, 
Contracting Officer’s Representatives, Disbursing Agents, and GCPC holders. 
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x Manpower, equipment and supplies required for contracting support and the 
deployment sequence. 
x Types of supplies, services, and construction customers can expect to receive 
through contingency contracting; list any special prioritization or control 
measures for scarce commodities or services. 
x Procedures for defining, validating, processing and satisfying customer 
requirements. 
x Procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors. 
x Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment. 
x Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor 
personnel. 
x Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions which apply to the 
supported operation.   
x Concept of contracting operations which is phased and synchronized with the 
supported plan. 
x Description and assessment of Host Nation agreements, customs, laws, 
culture, language, religion, and business practices which will impact on 
contracting operations. 
x Environmental impacts of the operation. 
(DAU, 2003) 
The bare bones version of the CCSP written for 1003V operations base 
plan contained few of these items.  The majority of the contract planning that should have 
been completed as part of the deliberate planning process was left to be conducted in-
theater in a rapid, reactionary manner.  One reason for the poor contracting planning that 
was conducted during the deliberate planning process is the lack of contracting officer 
representation on the combatant commander’s planning staff.  The tendency of the 
logistics planners on the Central Command planning staff was to focus on their previous 
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experience during Operation Desert Storm where contractor involvement was very low 
and most service support was provided by military combat service support units. 
 
b. Operational and Strategic Oversight 
Once OIF commenced, there was no concerted effort by the combatant 
commander to unify the efforts of the many contingency contracting officers or provide 
any kind of joint strategic or operational level oversight to direct their efforts toward a 
common goal.   
Contingency contracting officers were located with nearly every major 
subordinate command.  These CCOs focused on tactical level issues that directly affected 
the command they were supporting.  When interviewed, several CCOs reported they 
frequently executed contracts that overlapped services with adjoining units, never 
knowing the other unit was procuring the same service.  This focus on the tactical, close-
in issues continues today as the same CCOs have reported they do not believe it is part of 
their job to act as a liaison between contractors and the tactical commander that controls 
the area where they are working. 
In January of 2005, the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq (JCC-I) was 
stood up to provide strategic and operational level coordination and direction to the 
contracting efforts throughout Iraq.  The stated mission of the JCC-I is “Provide 
responsive operational contracting support to the Chief of Mission and Multi-National 
Corps - Iraq to efficiently acquire vital supplies, services and construction in support of 
the Coalition Forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.” 
The JCC-I has made significant progress toward coordinating the efforts 
of the CCOs working throughout Iraq and has successfully leveraged the ability to create 
blanket contracts and purchase agreements to save significant amounts of money.  
However, the JCC-I did little to correct the issues of coordinating the movement and 




7. Military Understanding of Reconstruction Operations 
The reduction in organic military service support units and the increased role of 
contractors in the reconstruction phase of OIF has had another negative effect; tactical 
military commanders do not have a full understanding of the criticality of contractor 
reconstruction operations.  The distinct separation of contractor and military roles has 
created a lack of understanding between the two on how the actions of one can affect the 
other.  The lack of unity of command between these two entities has hampered the ability 
to fully integrate their efforts. 
 
a. Transition from Military to Reconstruction Operations 
From March to May of 2003, military offensive operations were the 
primary focus of OIF.  Following President Bush’s announcement of the end of hostilities 
on May 1, 2003, the focus has shifted from purely military operations.  Over time, the 
relative importance of reconstruction operations has gradually increased, while the role of 
military operations has decreased and become more focused on supporting and enabling 
reconstruction.  While this change is clear at the strategic level, it is not so obvious to 
commanders at the tactical level who may still view their primary goal as military 
victories, regardless of the affect on contractors. 
 
b. Tactical Actions Have Strategic Effects 
The actions of small military units operating at the tactical level or 
individual contractors can have large ramifications that can cause major shifts in strategy.  
An excellent example of this occurred in March 2004.  Four employees of Blackwater 
were ambushed and killed in Fallujah, Iraq.  A mob of Iraqis led by insurgents burned 
and mutilated the bodies and left two hanging from a bridge.  (Mangini, 2005)  The video 
of this event was seen around the world.   
The outrage caused by this event prompted a major strategic change in the 
Fallujah region.  The Marine Regiment responsible for this region had been prepared to 
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begin an operation the Commanding Officer referred to as a “hearts and minds” type 
campaign to increase trust between the local population and the Marine Regiment.  This 
campaign plan was shelved and the regiment was instead called upon to begin major 
offensive operations in Fallujah to punish the insurgents responsible for the murders of 
the contractors.  (Mangini, 2005) 
 
c. The DoD Lacks Standardized Training on Contractor Operations 
Prior to a deployment, military units receive extensive training packages 
to prepare them for the specifics of the theater of operations where they will be 
deploying.  This training involves topics as diverse as local culture and religion, climate, 
local laws, survival training and rules of engagement.  The DoD has not developed a 
standard training package to prepare commanders on how to interact and coordinate with 
contractors operating in Iraq. (GAO, 2005) 
The lack of pre-deployment training on contractor operations further 
exacerbates the lack of understanding and sometimes adversarial relationships that 
develop between contractors and military commanders.  Contractor operations and 
reconstruction operations in general is an area that few commanders have experience with 
prior to deploying to Iraq.  A pre-deployment training program on contractor operations 
and the role of the ROC as a coordination node would greatly assist commanders with 
understanding the importance of reconstruction operations in OIF and how the actions of 
small unit commanders can have negative consequences on those operations. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
From mess hall briefings to web based request forms, GPS tracking systems and 
co-located operations centers, interaction between PSCs and MSCs in Iraq has evolved 
greatly since the commencement of reconstruction operations.  This chapter has identified 
areas that pose continuing challenges to contractors and military units.  Based on this 
chapter’s previous analysis, the authors have identified five key challenges that affect the 
coordination of contractors on the battlefield.  They are identified as follows: 
 65
 
1. Lack of Doctrine Defining and Organizing the ROC 
The failure to plan for the scope of reconstruction operations and the sheer 
volume of contractors required to support those operations resulted in a coordination 
vacuum.  The failure to provide an effective coordination function resulted in multiple 
contracts being awarded for the same requirement, essential services not being supported, 
conflicts between military units and contractors and needless kidnappings and deaths of 
contractor personnel. (GAO, 2005) 
The DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have published doctrine on nearly every 
aspect of command, control and coordination on the battlefield.  The one notable absence 
is any doctrine that provides tactics, techniques and procedures for the management and 
coordination of the large volume of contractors required for effective reconstruction 
efforts. 
 
2. Reliance on Contractors to Provide Critical Coordination Functions 
The development of the ROC in such a short time by AEGIS Defence was an 
impressive accomplishment.  It is questionable whether the DoD could have successfully 
developed, staffed and deployed a similar organization in the same limited time period; 
however the continued reliance on civilian contracting to manage and operate the ROC 
system is inappropriate.   
The ROC has become a critical coordination node in Iraq.  The loss of the 
coordination functions provided by the ROC would have serious negative consequences 
for the contractors and the military units that interact with them.  The DoD currently 
lacks the ability to assume the coordination functions of the ROC in the event of default 
or termination of the AEGIS contract. 
 
3. Discretionary Use of the ROC by Contractors 
Currently, participation and use of the services provided by the ROC is voluntary 
and up to the discretion of each contractor.  The voluntary use of contractor registration, 
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movement control and tracking means that the ROC, and therefore the DoD, does not 
have an accurate or complete picture of contractor movements and activities. 
The incentive for a contractor to use the ROCs coordination functions is clear; 
coordinating movement through the ROC decreases the chance that the contractor will 
lose their life.  Despite this significant positive incentive, some contractors still choose to 
opt out of the services provided by the ROC.  There is no existing contract mechanism 
that mandates participation in the ROC or standardizes the contract language used for 
coordination of security, PSC management and subcontractors.   
 
4. Lack of Contingency Contracting Planning and Oversight 
The failure to include senior, experienced contingency contracting officers on the 
planning staffs of combatant commands has resulted in the publication of operation base 
plans that have sub-standard or non-existent contingency contractor support plans.  The 
result of this failure to plan for contractor operations in Iraq resulted in financial waste 
through overlapping contracts.  It also caused frustration for military commanders who 
struggled with the unfamiliar relationship with contractors and caused the needless deaths 
of contractor personnel. 
 
5. Lack of Pre-Deployment Training for Military Commanders 
The failure to provide pre-deployment training for military commanders on the 
significance of reconstruction operations in Iraq has continued to complicate the 
relationship between contractors and military commanders.  (GAO, 2005)  Many military 
commanders do not understand the lack of authority they have over contractors and do 







Unity of command is a critical element of military success.  Unity of command 
allows the commander to utilize all resources available toward a single overarching goal.  
The tactical commanders may not know exactly what their role is in the overall strategy, 
but with strong unity of command they know their actions are being coordinated toward a 
common goal.  Contractors are a vital part of the resources that can determine whether 
the overall strategy will fail or succeed.  The DoD must develop a means to include 
contractor operations under a strong unity of command. 
When combined, the issues identified above exacerbate the difficulties in 
developing unity of command on the battlefield.  All of these issues must be addressed 
and corrected in order for the DoD to exercise effective coordination of contractors on the 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this MBA Professional Report was to conduct an analysis of 
command and control relationships between civilian contractors and military units on the 
battlefield and identify any weaknesses in those relationships.  The previous chapters 
examined the history of contracting on the battlefield that has led to the current heavy 
reliance on contractor support in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and identified many of 
the weaknesses concerning the lack of coordination between military units and 
contractors operating independently on the battlefield.  Much of the authors’ research 
focused on the use of private security companies (PSCs) and the new challenges their 
employment brings. 
This chapter provides a number of recommendations that the Department of 
Defense may pursue in order to improve the coordination between military units and 
contractors operating on the battlefield.  The overarching theme of these 
recommendations is to improve communication and formalize relationships between 
military commanders and contractors. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Publish Joint Doctrine Defining the Role of the Reconstruction 
Operations Center (ROC) 
Currently, no doctrine exists on the establishment or employment of the ROC, 
either at the national or regional level.  As described in the previous chapter, the ROC is a 
concept that was invented in OIF in response to the military’s lack of control and 
accountability of contractors operating in Iraq.  The degree of contractor involvement in 
OIF was unprecedented and few military planners envisioned the need for a separate 
coordination body just to monitor contractors. 
The ROC has developed many ad-hoc methods of providing effective 
coordination and communication between participating contractors and military units; 
however, there is no documented plan on how to maintain the ROC after the current 
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contract expires.  There is a real risk that when the contract with AEGIS expires, there 
will be a loss of corporate knowledge on how to run the ROC.  The DoD must develop 
comprehensive turnover and lessons learned files in order to capture the accumulated 
knowledge, tactics, techniques and procedures that have been created by the national and 
regional ROCs in Iraq.  Additionally, the DoD must develop a long term plan for the 
establishment and operation of the ROC in future conflicts. 
It is recommended that the DoD develop doctrine for Joint Publication 3-0, Joint 
Operations that defines the role of the ROC as a coordinating function for future 
conflicts.  This will recognize the importance of the coordination function provided by 
the ROC and ensure that future military commanders are aware of the role of the ROC as 
an information provider, assisting the commander in making tactical decisions that may 
affect contractor operations. 
In addition to the inclusion in Joint Pub 3-0, the authors recommend that the DoD 
develop a new Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures publication that specifically 
present those processes successfully developed and employed by the ROC in OIF.  These 
processes would include, at a minimum, movement control procedures, briefings, 
communication bridges, registration of contractors, convoy procedures and methods of 
deconfliction between PSCs and military forces. 
 
2. Designate the Operation of the ROC a Military Function 
Currently, the ROC system is run by AEGIS, a contracted private security 
company with military members acting as liaisons between the ROC and their respective 
commands.  It is unclear what will happen when the current contract to support the ROC 
expires.  No one is able to definitively say who will be responsible for maintaining the 
tactics and techniques that have been developed by the current contractor.   
It is recommended that the management of the ROC become a military function, 
rather than the responsibility of a contracted company.  Operation of the ROC could still 
be supported by contracted workers who could conduct much of the functional work, but 
the leadership and direction of the ROC should be provided by a military staff.  This staff 
 71
could be either all DoD, or in a combined forces theater it could include representation 
from several Allied military forces. 
The benefits and challenges of using contractor personnel for support staff in the 
ROC would need to be carefully examined by the DoD.  While using contractor 
personnel creates an easy answer to manning questions, the contract language would have 
to be carefully crafted to ensure that the military Officer in Charge (OIC) of the ROC had 
the authority to direct the daily activities of the contractor personnel.  If every order that 
the OIC issued was viewed as a contract change that had to be vetted through a 
Contracting Officer, the ROC would quickly become a pointless bureaucracy that 
accomplished nothing. 
The method for operating the ROC could be based on the model of the Logistic 
Movement Coordination Center (LMCC) utilized by the Marine Expeditionary Force.  
The LMCC is a permanent structure that is minimally staffed by two officers and 
approximately eight enlisted members during peace time operations.  In times of conflict 
or deployment, the LMCC will be supported by many additional officers and enlisted 
members, but the original staff provides the core expertise and direction.   
A similar principle could be applied when designing a permanent ROC structure.  
This would ensure a continuity of processes even if the support personnel were provided 
by a contractor rather than military forces.  Additionally, if contract support was used, the 
expiration and recompeting of the contract would not threaten the continuity of 
procedures and processes used by the ROC.  
Placing the ROC under military command will facilitate dedicating more military 
communication and network assets to its operation.  This will allow the ROC to tie into 
the combatant commander’s common operation picture (COP) software.  Tying into the 
COP will allow the ROC to have a current picture of the disposition of friendly and 
enemy forces.  The ROC would also be able to update the COP with the location of 
contractors operating independently on the battlefield.  This information would then be 
available to military forces planning operations in those areas 
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3. Make Participation in the ROC Mandatory for all Contractors that 
Operate Independently on the Battlefield Through a Proposed 
DFARS Clause 
Currently, participation in the ROC is at the discretion of each contractor.  There 
is no requirement for contractors to register with the ROC or report their movement 
activities.  This minimizes the effectiveness of the ROC by not presenting a true picture 
of contractor activities and location to interested military commanders.  Additionally, by 
not participating in the ROC’s intelligence briefings and security updates, contractors are 
increasing the risk that they will become the victims of enemy actions.   
Private security companies that fail to participate in the ROC’s security updates 
are operating at increased risk to themselves and to US and allied military forces.  The 
lack of knowledge of current military operations means that PSC escorts may find their 
planned route takes them into areas that are the target of military engagement or may 
cause confusion resulting in PSC escorts opening fire on military checkpoints. 
The authors propose that all contractor personnel must register with the ROC and 
utilize the movement control and security update services offered by the ROC.  In order 
to mandate these actions, it is recommended that a DFARS amendment be issued with 
contract clauses that are mandatory for contracts involving independent operations by 
contractor personnel on the battlefield.  This clause would require participation in the 
ROC for all contractors and any sub-contractors, including PSCs, which operate 
independently on the battlefield.  A draft DFARS clause is included in Appendix II. 
The challenge with this recommendation will be enforcement.  While it will be 
relatively easy to ensure that prime contractors and even first tier sub-contractors are 
registered with the ROC, it will be difficult to verify that lower tier sub-contractors who 
may be hired long after the prime contract is awarded are registered.  While failure to 
register sub-contractors with the ROC may be considered to be cause for termination for 
default if this recommendation is adopted, it may not be feasible to pursue this as a means 
of enforcing this clause.  Termination of a contractor on the battlefield who is otherwise 




4. Increase Strategic and Operational Level of Contracting Planning 
Until recently, no one command had cognizance or control over contingency 
contracting efforts in Iraq.  Contingency Contracting Officers were operating purely at 
the tactical level with little oversight or coordination of effort.  In January of 2005, the 
Joint Contracting Command – Iraq / Afghanistan (JCC-IA) was stood up to consolidate 
coordination of CCOs under one command.  The JCC-IA is still struggling to firmly 
establish its mission but has been successful in its efforts to coordinate CCO efforts and 
leverage operational level effects.  However, no effort has been made to ensure that 
operational and strategic contracting planning will be accomplished for the next conflict.  
The DoD should implement the Yoder 3-Tier model to ensure that individuals with 
significant contracting knowledge and experience are identified to work on planning 
staffs, ensuring that adequate attention is given to contracting issues during deliberate and 
crisis action planning. (Yoder, 2004) 
 
5. Develop Pre-Deployment Training for Command Staffs at the MEF / 
Corps Level Concerning the ROC 
Participation by all contractors that operate on the battlefield is critical to the 
success of the ROC’s mission.  However, the information gathered by the ROC is 
meaningless if tactical commanders do not understand how to use that information.  The 
DoD should mandate training at the MEF / Corps level on the role of the ROC and 
potential effects of contractors operating independently in the commander’s battle space. 
Tactical commanders must adequately understand the role and importance of 
contractor operations.  Military operations must be planned with contractor operations as 
a consideration.  Current training and doctrine views contractor operations as a concern 
only for logisticians and not for combat forces.  A shift in this attitude is required to 
ensure that commander’s fully consider the effect of operations on contractor efforts.  
Receiving training prior to deployment will allow and encourage commanders to include 




The system that developed in Iraq of using regional ROCs supported and 
coordinated by a national ROC has grown into a highly capable coordination system, but 
it requires subtle changes to make it more effective.  Mandatory participation by all 
contractors and more effective coordination with military forces will increase the benefits 
that are attained.  Ultimately this will lead to increased coordination between contractors 
that will reduce duplication of effort and more importantly will reduce the incidence of 
friendly fire and contractor deaths. 
The coordination function performed by the ROC should be viewed as a critical 
military function on the battlefield.  The ROC should receive a level of support similar to 
a Joint Operations Center.  The increased reliance on contractor-provided services to 
sustain military operations demands that the DoD take a more hands-on approach to 
coordinating the movement and actions of contractors on the battlefield. 
The ROC is a vital function when contractors are operating independently on the 
battlefield.  This critical coordination center should not be a contracted function, but 
should be established as a military command defined by joint doctrine.  The tactics, 
techniques, procedures and lessons learned must be preserved so this function may be 
repeated in the next conflict without experiencing the same steep, and deadly, learning 
curve. 
 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
1. Communication Assets Needed for the ROC 
The functionality of the ROC is highly dependent on robust communication 
assets.  The minimum communication methods necessary would include secure and open 
voice and data transmission equipment as well as secure data processing capability.  
What specific assets are required for the ROC (national and regional) to effectively track 
and coordinate the efforts of contractors operating independently on the battlefield, 
maintain a current intelligence picture and provide the means to deconflict military 
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activity with contractor functions?  Where will these communications be sourced from 
and who will be responsible for maintaining and operating the equipment? 
 
2. Manpower Analysis of Personnel Required to Operate the ROC and 
Identify Sources for Those Personnel 
When the ROC is fully functional in an operational environment, how many 
people will be required to adequately staff the ROC and what is the right mix of rank and 
skills required to effectively carry out the command and control functions?  Is it 
advantageous to create a permanent staff that will maintain the skills needed to run the 
ROC at times when the ROC is not required?  Where should the personnel assigned to the 
ROC be sourced from? 
 
3. What Must be Done to Incentivize Contractors to Fully Cooperate 
with the ROC 
Will mandatory participation in the ROC create a strong disincentive to 
contractors who would otherwise make offers for contracts on the battlefield?  If so, what 
incentives can be built into contracts for contractors to fully cooperate with the ROC?   
 
4. How can Classified Intelligence be Used to Inform Contractors that 
May Not Have Adequate Security Clearances 
Contractor personnel and PSCs will be able to make informed risk decisions if 
current and accurate intelligence briefings are available on local threat conditions.  What 
intelligence sharing methods can be used in the ROC to ensure contractors are aware of 
potentially dangerous situations while preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified 
material to contractors that do not posses adequate clearance? 
 
5. Should the Department of State Assume Control of the ROC 
Functions From the DoD at the End of Phase IV Operations 
As a theater moves from military conflict to reconstruction, the role of the DoD 
will begin to shrink and the role of the DOS will grow.  Is it appropriate for the DOS to 
 76
assume responsibility for running the ROC at some point in the transition?  Does the 
DOS have the manpower and skill required to provide the command and control 










































APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRES 
A. CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
Purpose of Questionnaire:  To collect real world examples and insights regarding the 
interaction between tactical units and civilian contractors in a battlespace.  This 
information will be processed and used in support of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
School of Business and Public Policy research project requirement. 
 
Project abstract:  The purpose of this research project is to examine the issues 
concerning the command and control of civilian contractors in a combat environment.  
Outsourcing of non-military specific job functions to civilian contractors has produced 
unexpected complications when examined in the context of an extended war-time 
scenario.  The objectives of this project are to identify the weaknesses of current 
command and control doctrine as it applies to civilian contractors and to identify issues 
faced by tactical commanders created by civilian contractors operating in their 
battlespace.  The product of this project will be a potential course of action that the 
Department of Defense can pursue to correct any deficiencies in the command and 
control of civilian contractors. 
 
Instructions:  This questionnaire is unclassified.  Be as specific and detailed as you can.  
Please answer questions to the best of your ability and return to Major Matt Howes at 
mfhowes@nps.edu NLT 30 July 2006.  Questions can be directed to Major Matt Howes 
at 831 241 0137 or mfhowes@nps.edu.   
 
Definitions:  For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions from Joint 
Publication 1-02 apply: 
 
 Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of a mission.  
 
 Battlespace:  A geographical area, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear 
boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has 
responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.  
 
 Communications:  The management of one unit’s ability to exchange information 
with another. 
   
Information management:  The exchange of facts, data or instructions in any 
medium or form. 
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 Contingency management:  The management of any emergency involving 
military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military 
operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid 
response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, 




1. What capacity did you serve and with whom?  (For example:  Executive, security 
specialist, team leader/ KBR, DynCorp, Blackwater etc) 
 
2. Where did you serve?  (For example: Al Anbar, Kuwait, etc) 
 
3. When did you serve overseas with the company and capacity stated above? 
 
4. In the above stated capacity what relationship, if any, did you have with a U.S. 
Government contracting officer or contracting officer representative? 
 
5. What issues concerning battlespace management did you encounter while serving 
overseas? (For example:  Military control measures, permissive/restrictive fire 
support and airspace coordination measures)  Please be as specific as possible with 
dates, military units etc. 
 
6. What issues concerning communications did you encounter while serving overseas?  
(For example: ability to talk to/with military units?  Did you or the military 
coordinate communications links?  Liaison requested?  How did it work if 
coordination was done?  Terminology differences, lack of procedures?) 
 
7. What issues concerning information management did you encounter while serving 
overseas?  (For example: what level of information were you provided?  Did you 
request?  Did you think you needed? Intel, questions on terrain, weather, 
friendly/enemy situations, IEDs, adjacent units, ‘manifest’ data provided, list of 
phone numbers, timeline, route?) 
 
8. What issues concerning contingency management did you encounter while serving 
overseas?  (For example:  Did you coordinate for such things as use of a military’s 
quick reaction force, Medevac, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, non 
combatant evacuation operation) 
 
9. Are there any mechanisms or policies in place currently that assist you coordinating 
your movements within a military battlespace?  (For example:  movement control 
centers, non official or official DOD websites, Air Tasking Orders etc) 
 
10. What recommendations would you make as to how to fix any problems of command 
and control between civilian contractors and the military in a battlespace? 
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11. In your opinion what is the biggest issue regarding civilian contractor and military 
management in a battlespace? 
 
12. Please relay any additional personal experiences regarding civilian contractors and 
the military in a battlespace. 
 
13. Would you be willing to be contacted by the parties who developed this questionnaire 
for telephonic interview or follow up regarding some or all of the answers you 
provided?  (For example:  To request copies of company after action reports, 
clarification or to add depth of answers) 
 
14. Would you like to remain anonymous in all follow up published reports or papers?  
YES ___ or NO ___ 
 
15. Would you like to view the final written report prior to publishing?                        
YES ___ or NO ___ 
 
16. Name:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
17. Email address:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
18. Phone number:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
19. Are you willing to be quoted or cited in this research project?  YES ___ or NO ___ 
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B. TACTICAL COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Purpose of Questionnaire:  To collect real world examples and insights regarding the 
interaction between tactical units and civilian contractors in a battlespace.  This 
information will be processed and used in support of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
School of Business and Public Policy research project requirement. 
 
Project abstract:  The purpose of this research project is to examine the issues 
concerning the command and control of civilian contractors in a combat environment.  
Outsourcing of non-military specific job functions to civilian contractors has produced 
unexpected complications when examined in the context of an extended war-time 
scenario.  The objectives of this project are to identify the weaknesses of current 
command and control doctrine as it applies to civilian contractors and to identify issues 
faced by tactical commanders created by civilian contractors operating in their 
battlespace.  The product of this project will be a potential course of action that the 
Department of Defense can pursue to correct any deficiencies in the command and 
control of civilian contractors. 
 
Instructions:  This questionnaire is unclassified.  Be as specific and detailed as you can.  
Please answer questions to the best of your ability and return to Major Matt Howes at 
mfhowes@nps.edu NLT 30 July 2006.   Questions can be directed to Major Matt Howes 
at 831 241 0137 or mfhowes@nps.edu.   
 
Definitions:  For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions from Joint 
Publication 1-02 apply: 
 
 Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of a mission.  
 
 Battlespace:  A geographical area, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear 
boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has 
responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.  
 
 Communications:  The management of one unit’s ability to exchange information 
with another. 
   
Information management:  The exchange of facts, data or instructions in any 
medium or form. 
 
 Contingency management:  The management of any emergency involving 
military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military 
operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid 
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response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, 





1. What capacity did you serve and with whom?  (For example:  S3, FAC, FSC, AirO, 
CO, XO) 
 
2. Where did you serve?   
 
3. When did you serve overseas with the unit and capacity stated above? 
 
4. In the above stated capacity, what relationship, if any, did you have with the 
supporting Marine Corps contracting officer? 
 
5. What issues concerning civilian contractors and battlespace management did you 
encounter while serving overseas? (For example:  Any violation of control measures, 
permissive/restrictive fire support and airspace coordination measures)  Please, be as 
specific as possible with dates, civilian companies, etc. 
 
6. What issues concerning civilian contractors and communications did you encounter 
while serving overseas?  (For example: ability to talk to/with civilian contractors.  
Did the civilian contractors make efforts to coordinate communications links, liaison 
requested?  How did it work if coordination was done?  Terminology differences, 
lack of procedures? Blue force tracker?) 
 
7. What issues concerning civilian contractors and information management did you 
encounter while serving overseas?  (For example: what level of information were they 
provided?  Did they ask for?  Do you think they need? Intel, questions on terrain, 
weather, friendly/enemy sits, IEDs, adjacent units, ‘manifest’ data provided, list of 
phone numbers, timeline, routes?) 
 
8. What issues concerning civilian contractors and contingency management did you 
encounter while serving overseas?  What effect did it put on your unit’s ability to 
conduct operations?  (For example:  QRF, Medevac, TRAP, NEO) 
 
9. If specific problems were encountered, what actions did you take internal to your 
organization to mitigate the effects of contractors in your battlespace?  (For example:  
SOP changes, recommended changes to MCOs/DivO/RegO,MEFO active seeking out 
of contractors, ‘road guards’ or OPs to observe who enters your battlespace, inform 
HHQ and request guidance) 
 
10. If civilian contractors were found operating in your battlespace without coordination, 
what actions did you take or whom did you inform?   
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11. Are there any mechanisms or policies in place currently that assist you in your duties 
regarding command and control of civilian contractors inside of a battlespace?  (For 
example:  TMCC, non official or official DOD websites etc) 
 
12. If specific problems were encountered, what recommendations would you make to fix 
the problem of command and control of civilian contractors in a battlespace? 
 
13. In your opinion what is the biggest issue regarding civilian contractor management in 
your battlespace? 
 
14. Please relay any additional personal experiences regarding civilian contractors in your 
battlespace.  (For example: Sea stories?) 
 
15. Would you be willing to be contacted by the parties who developed this questionnaire 
for telephonic interview or follow up regarding some or all of the answers you 
provided?  (For example:  To request copies of unit AAR, clarification or to add 
depth of answers) 
 
16. Would you like to remain anonymous in all follow up published reports or papers?  
YES ___ or NO ___ 
 
17. Name:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
18. Email address:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
19. Phone number:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
20. Are you willing to be quoted or cited in this research project?  YES ___ or NO ___ 
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C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTOR QUESTIONNAIRE 
Purpose of Questionnaire:  To collect real world examples and insights regarding the 
interaction between tactical units and civilian contractors in a battlespace.  This 
information will be processed and used in support of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
School of Business and Public Policy research project requirement. 
 
Project abstract:  The purpose of this research project is to examine the issues 
concerning the command and control of civilian contractors in a combat environment.  
Outsourcing of non-military specific job functions to civilian contractors has produced 
unexpected complications when examined in the context of an extended war-time 
scenario.  The objectives of this project are to identify the weaknesses of current 
command and control doctrine as it applies to civilian contractors and to identify issues 
faced by tactical commanders created by civilian contractors operating in their 
battlespace.  The product of this project will be a potential course of action that the 
Department of Defense can pursue to correct any deficiencies in the command and 
control of civilian contractors. 
 
Instructions:  This questionnaire is unclassified.  Be as specific and detailed as you can.  
Please answer questions to the best of your ability and return to Major Joe Butkus at 
jjbutkus@nps.edu NLT 5 Aug 2006.   Questions can be directed to Major Joe Butkus at 
jjbutkus@nps.edu.  
 
Definitions:  For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions from Joint 
Publication 1-02 apply: 
 
 Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of a mission.  
 
 Battlespace:  A geographical area, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear 
boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has 
responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.  
 
 Communications:  The management of one unit’s ability to exchange information 
with another. 
   
Information management:  The exchange of facts, data or instructions in any 
medium or form. 
 
 Contingency management:  The management of any emergency involving 
military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military 
operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid 
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response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, 





1. Where and when did you serve as a Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO)?   
 
2. Were you part of a Joint Contracting Office? 
 
3. What issues concerning civilian contractors and battlespace management did you 
encounter while serving overseas? (For example:  Any violation of control measures, 
permissive/restrictive fire support and airspace coordination measures)  Please, be as 
specific as possible. 
 
4. What issues concerning civilian contractors and communications did you encounter 
while serving overseas?  (For example: ability to talk to/with civilian contractors.  
Did the civilian contractors make efforts to coordinate communications links, liaison 
requested?  How did it work if coordination was done?  Terminology differences, 
lack of procedures? Blue force tracker?) 
 
5. What issues concerning civilian contractors and information management did you 
encounter while serving overseas?  (For example: what level of information were they 
provided?  Did they ask for?  Do you think they need? Intel, questions on terrain, 
weather, friendly/enemy sits, IEDs, adjacent units, ‘manifest’ data provided, list of 
phone numbers, timeline, routes?) 
 
6. What issues concerning civilian contractors and contingency management did you 
encounter while serving overseas?  Were you ever asked to help coordinate planning 
for issues such as Medevac, TRAP, NEO for civilian contractors? 
 
7. If specific problems were encountered, what actions did you take to mitigate the 
effects of contractors in a unit’s battlespace?  For example, what efforts were made to 
deconflict issues between the tactical commander and the contractor. 
 
8. If civilian contractors were reported to be operating in a unit’s battlespace without 
coordination, what actions did you take to rectify the situation?   
 
9. Are there any mechanisms or policies in place currently that assist you in your duties 
regarding command and control of civilian contractors inside of a battlespace?  (For 
example:  TMCC, non official or official DOD websites etc) 
 
10. If specific problems were encountered, what recommendations would you make to fix 
the problem of command and control of civilian contractors in a battlespace? 
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11. In your opinion what is the biggest issue regarding civilian contractor management in 
your battlespace? 
 
12. Please relay any additional personal experiences regarding civilian contractors on the 
battlefield.  (For example: Sea stories?) 
 
13. Would you be willing to be contacted by the parties who developed this questionnaire 
for telephonic interview or follow up regarding some or all of the answers you 
provided?  (For example:  To request copies of unit AAR, clarification or to add 
depth of answers) 
 
14. Would you like to remain anonymous in all follow up published reports or papers?  
YES ___ or NO ___ 
 
15. Name:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
16. Email address:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 
17. Phone number:  (Will be kept confidential for purposes of this project) 
 



































APPENDIX B. DRAFT DFARS CLAUSES 
A. 252.225-70XX REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL TO 
REGISTER WITH THE RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS CENTER 
 
 (a)  Definitions.  As used in this clause— 
 “Chief of Mission” means the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the 
United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. 
The COM is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The 
COM is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government 
executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area 
military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the COM's direct responsibility.  
 “Combatant Commander” means the commander of a unified or specified combatant 
command established in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 161. 
 “Contractor personnel” are civilians accompanying or supporting the US Armed Forces. 
 “Independent operations” means work or actions conducted by contractor personnel in 
areas of the theater of operation that are not under direct control of US or allied military 
forces. 
 “Other military operations” means a range of military force responses that can be 
projected to accomplish assigned tasks.  Such operations may include one or a combination of 
the following:  civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities 
to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures 
to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey messages to adversaries; 
military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment 
operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and 
strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international 
criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law 
enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgency, 
counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. 
 “Prime Contractor” means The entity with whom an agent of the United States entered 
into a prime contract for the purposes of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services 
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of any kind. “Reconstruction Operations Center” (ROC) means the joint operations center 
tasked with the responsibility for tracking contractor personnel registration and movements 
within the theater of operations. 
 “Theater of operations” means an area defined by the combatant commander for the 
conduct or support of specified operations.   
  
 (b)  General.   
  (1)  This clause applies when Contractor personnel are authorized to accompany US 
Armed Forces deployed outside the United States in— 
   (i)  Contingency operations; 
   (ii)  Humanitarian or peacekeeping operations;  
   (iii)  Other military operations; or  
   (iv)  Military exercises designated by the Combatant Commander. 
 
  (2)  Contract performance in support of US Armed Forces deployed outside the 
United States may require work in dangerous or austere conditions.  The Contractor accepts 
the risks associated with required contract performance in such operations. 
 
 (c)  Registration. 
  (1)  It is the prime contractor’s responsibility to ensure that all contractor personnel 
register with the ROC within seventy-two hours of arrival within the theater of operations and 
prior to beginning any independent operations.  At a minimum, contractor personnel will 
provide – 
   (i)  By name list of all contract personnel in the theater of operations, 
   (ii)  Copy of the statement of work to include- 
    (A)  Specific location of work 
    (B)  Nature of work 
    (C)  Estimated timeline for completion of work 




 (d)  Movement Coordination. 
  (1)  All movement of contractor personnel within the theater of operations will be 
coordinated with the combatant commander through the ROC using the appropriate 
transportation request form provided by the ROC. 
  (2)  Routine movement requests will be submitted to the ROC no later than forty-
eight hours prior to movement. 
  (3)  Urgent movement requests will be coordinated by the ROC on a prioritized basis. 
 
 (e)  Security. 
  (1)  Contractor personnel operating independently within the theater of operations 
will be responsible for providing their own security.  This may be provided internally or sub-
contracted through a private security company and must be in accordance with DFARS 
252.225-70XX. 
   (i)  Contractor personnel are responsible for all costs associated with protection 
of contractor and US Government employees from the actions of terrorists and criminals, 
protection of base camps, security escort to facilitate movement of personnel and equipment, 
hardening of facilities, procurement of hardened vehicles and procurement of protective gear 
as required.   
  (2)  The combatant commander and/or the chief of mission may prescribe minimum 
requirements for security personnel, equipment and qualifications. 
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B. 252.225-70XX.  REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL TO 
REQUIRE PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES TO REGISTER WITH 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS CENTER 
 
 (a)  Definitions.  As used in this clause— 
 “Chief of Mission” means the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the 
United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. 
The COM is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The 
COM is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government 
executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area 
military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the COM's direct responsibility.  
 “Combatant Commander” means the commander of a unified or specified combatant 
command established in accordance with 10 USC. 161. 
 “Contractor personnel” are civilians accompanying or supporting the US Armed Forces. 
 “Independent operations” means work or actions conducted by contractor personnel in 
areas of the theater of operation that are not under direct control of US or allied military 
forces. 
 “Other military operations” means a range of military force responses that can be 
projected to accomplish assigned tasks.  Such operations may include one or a combination of 
the following:  civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities 
to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures 
to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey messages to adversaries; 
military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment 
operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and 
strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international 
criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law 
enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgency, 
counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. 
 “Prime Contractor” means The entity with whom an agent of the United States entered 
into a prime contract for the purposes of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services 
of any kind. 
 91
  “Reconstruction Operations Center” (ROC) means the joint operations center tasked with 
the responsibility for tracking contractor personnel registration and movements within the 
theater of operations. 
 “Theater of operations” means an area defined by the combatant commander for the 
conduct or support of specified operations. 
  
 (b)  General. 
  (1)  This clause applies when contractor personnel engaged in independent operations 
utilize a sub-contracted private security company to provide protection for contractor 
personnel and work sites. 
  (2)  Contractor personnel are responsible for the actions of sub-contracted private 
security companies. 
 
 (c)  Registration. 
  (1)  The prime contractor will ensure that private security company personnel register 
with the ROC within seventy-two hours of arrival in the theater of operations and prior to 
conducting security operations.  At a minimum, contractor personnel will provide – 
   (i)  By name list of all private security company personnel in the theater of 
operations and  
   (ii)  Copy of the statement of work to include- 
    (A)  Specific location of work 
    (B)  Nature of work 
    (C)  Estimated timeline for completion of work 
   (iii)  Serialized list of all weapons operated by the private security company. 
   (iv)  Frequencies or cellular phone numbers used by the private security 
company for internal communication. 
 
 (d)  Movement Coordination. 
  (1)  All movement of contractor personnel within the theater of operations will be 
coordinated with the combatant commander through the ROC using the appropriate 
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transportation request form provided by the ROC. 
  (2)  Routine movement requests will be submitted to the ROC no later than forty-
eight hours prior to movement. 
  (3)  Urgent movement requests will be coordinated by the ROC on a prioritized basis. 
  (4)  Private security company personnel are responsible for receiving a security 
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